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1. MOTIVATIONAL REMARKS
Tarski’s classic paper “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”
is nicely representative of the state of logic in the 1930s: It is as much
about what one cannot do as it is about what one can do. On the neg-
ative (or ‘limitative’) side, we have Tarski’s celebrated theorem on the
indefinability of truth. On the positive (or ‘constructive’) side, we have
Tarski’s demonstration that, for a large range of theories T , it is possible
to add a theory of truth to T in such a way that the resulting theory is
not only consistent (if T is) but also fruitful: Within it, we can prove the
sorts of meta-mathematical results for which the notion of truth was
then already being used. In particular, if we add a theory of truth to
Peano arithmetic, PA—if, that is, we add axioms like “A conjunction is
true iff both its conjuncts are true”, and so forth—then we will be able
to prove that PA is consistent by the following sort of argument: The
axioms are all true; the rules of inference preserve truth; hence every
theorem of PA is true; but some sentences, such as ‘0 = 1’, are false; so
some sentences are not theorems of PA; so PA is consistent.
Since PA plus a truth-theory proves that PA is consistent, it follows
from Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem that the former is stronger
than the latter. It is tempting, therefore, to want to use this fact to inter-
pret Tarski’s famous claim in “The Semantic Conception of Truth” that
the metalanguage must be ‘essentially richer’ than the object langauge
(Tarski, 1944, p. 354). As we shall see, however, that would be to confuse
a question about expressive power with a question about logical strength.
It is possible to formalize a materially adequate theory of truth for the
language of set-theory in a meta-theory that is as weak as it is a priori
possible for it to be: one interpretable in Robinson arithmetic. If so, then
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Tarski’s claim about essential richness cannot concern logical strength.
Not, at least, if it is to have any hope of being true.
One might yet wonder, though, if there is not some way of understand-
ing what a truth-theory buys us in terms of logical strength. And here
is where we meet the central motivation for the present paper. It seems
to be widely believed that a truth-theory by itself has no logical power
at all. The proof of PA’s consistency mentioned above depends not just
upon the availability of a theory of truth but also upon our extending the
induction axioms beyond those of PA to permit semantic vocabulary. If
we do not allow ‘semantic’ induction, then the resulting theory is a con-
servative extension of PA. Of course, there are other ways of comparing
the strength of theories. In particular, it is compatible with a theory T ’s
being a conservative extension of another theory U that T should not be
interpretable in U . But if we take PA and add a truth-theory, then the
result is interpretable in PA so long as we do not extend induction. So
that might seem to seal it: Truth-theories have no logical strength on
their own.
It will emerge below, however, that PA is, in several respects, a very
special case. What does or doesn’t happen when we add a truth-theory
to PA is not uninteresting, but it is often very different from what hap-
pens when we add one to some other theory, in particular, to a finitely
axiomatized theory. And it seems to me that, if we want to know how
strong truth-theories are on their own, then the right question to ask
is not “What happens when you add a truth-theory to PA?” but: What
happens when we add a truth-theory to an arbitrary theory T ?
Once we have reframed the investigation in these terms, then several
sorts of questions become natural:
(1) What is the weakest theory T such that the result of adding a
truth-theory to T yields a materially adequate theory of truth for
the language of T ?
(2) What, in general, is the strength of such a theory, as compared
to that of T , if we do not extend whatever induction axioms are
present in T to permit semantic vocabulary?
(3) What happens if we do extend T ’s induction axioms? In particular,
for which theories T does the result of adding the truth-theoretic
axioms and extending T ’s induction scheme allow us to prove the
consistency of T ?
(4) What is the strength of the theory mentioned in (3), as compared
to that of the ‘base’ theory T ?
Much turns on precisely how we formulate the truth-theory and on what
sorts of base theories are in question. In particular, we shall see that
the usual way of ‘adding a truth-theory’, though it allows a nice answer
to (2), gives us only dissatisfying answers to (3) and (4). But there is a
different, and older, way to proceed—Tarski’s original way—that allows
2
answers to these questions that are about as elegant as one could hope
they would be.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In an effort to make the discussion
as accessible as possible I will quickly introduce in Section 2 some of the
central concepts from logic that we shall be using. In Section 3, we’ll
discuss the usual way of ‘adding a truth-theory’ and see that there is
a materially adequate and fully compositional theory of truth for the
language of arithmetic that is about as weak as it could be. Section 4
introduces some machinery from the study of sub-systems of PA which
may be less familiar. This is applied in Section 5, where we will get
our first characterization of the strength of truth-theories and see a
first respect in which PA is a special case, as well as discover some
annoying limitations of the approach we will have been pursuing to that
point. Section 6 explores a different way of ‘adding a truth-theory’ and
gives nice answers to the questions above. We’ll also see another, more
impressive respect in which PA is a special case. Finally, Section 7 briefly
considers how our results bear upon some philosophical questions about
the role truth-theories play in semantic consistency proofs.
2. LOGICAL PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Interpretatability. The languages in which we’ll be interested
here are first-order languages, constructed from atomic expressions—
terms, function-symbols, and predicates of one or more places—in the
usual way. These languages will also be finite, in the sense that they
have only finitely many atomic expressions. It is convenient to identify
a language with the set of its atomic expressions, together with some
indication of their logical type, that is, with what is sometimes called the
‘signature’ of the language.
A theory here is always a recursively axiomatized theory, unless other-
wise stated, and, officially, we understand the notion in an intensional
sense: A theory is not a set of axioms but a ‘presentation’ of a set of
axioms. Formally, a theory can be understood as given by a formula
in one free variable, where the axioms of the theory are the sentences
of whose Gödel numbers that formula is true. When a theory has only
finitely many axioms, the distinction between intensional and exten-
sional conceptions more or less lapses. But it does matter, in general, as
Feferman (1960) made abundantly clear.
A theory is ‘stated in’ a language.
There are a number of ways of comparing the logical strength of theo-
ries. If the theories are stated in the same language, then the obvious
question is whether one proves all the results the other proves. Compari-
son is more difficult when the theories are stated in different languages.
In that case, the theories will trivially prove different theorems: If A
is in the language of the one but not the other, then pA ∨ ¬Aq will be a
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theorem of the one but not the other; this is true even if the (non-logical)
axioms of the two theories are the same.
If the language of one theory contains that of the other, then one way
to compare them is to ask if the first is a ‘conservative extension’ of the
second, that is, whether the theory in the extended language proves any
new theorems that can be stated in the original language. But even this
fails if the theories are not so related. In that case, the usual method of
comparison uses the notion of interpretation, which was first explored in
a systematic way by Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson (1953), although
the basic idea is much older.
Let theories B (for ‘base’) and T (for ‘target’) be given, stated in lan-
guages LB and LT , respectively. A relative interpretation1 of T in B
consists of two parts: a translation of LT into LB, and proofs in B of
the translations of the axioms of T . The translation is compositional,
in the sense that the only thing we actually need to do is define the
(non-logical) atomic expressions of LT in terms of those of LB2 and spec-
ify a ‘domain’ for the interpretation in terms of a formula δ(x) of LB.
This can then be extended to a complete translation of LT into LB in
the obvious way, where quantifiers are ‘relativized’ to δ(x): ∀xφ(x) is
translated as: ∀x(δ(x)→ φ∗(x)), where φ∗(x) translates φ(x); ∃xφ(x), as:
∃x(δ(x) ∧ φ∗(x)). As well as proofs of the translations of the axioms, we
also need proofs of δ(t∗), for each atomic term t of LT , and of the closure
condition
∀x1 · · ·xn(δ(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ δ(xn)→ δ(f∗(x1, . . . , xn)))
for each primitive function-symbol f , of however many places. We also
need (if this isn’t already covered) a proof that the domain is non-empty:
∃xδ(x).
It follows that, if B is consistent, so is T . If a contradiction could
be derived from the axioms of T , that proof could be mimicked in B:
Just prove the translations of the axioms of T used in the proof of the
contradiction, then append (a modified version of) the proof given in T .
Indeed, quite generally, if Σ `T A, then Σ∗ `B A∗, where, again, the
asterisk means: translation of. Moreover, if B and T are not too terribly
weak,3 then all of this will be provable in B and T themselves. So, in
particular, T will prove Con(B)→ Con(T ) and so cannot prove Con(B),
though B might well prove Con(T ).
Note that interpretability is transitive and reflexive.
1In fact, there are several different notions of interpretation. We shall only need this
one.
2It is convenient to allow terms and function-symbols to be translated using descrip-
tions, which can then be eliminated as Russell taught. In that case, we need B to prove
that the descriptions are proper.
3Facts concerning interpretability can generally be verified in the theory known as
I∆0 + ω1, for which see below.
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One way to give content to the idea that B is at least as strong as
T is therefore to take it to mean: T is relatively interpretable in B.
That this is a useful way to give content to the intuitive idea of relative
strength emerged only after a good deal of hard work, beginning with
Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson (1953) and continuing through work
by Feferman (1960) to the present day (e.g., Visser, 2006).
Though the notion of interpretation is particularly useful when we
are dealing with theories stated in different languages, we can still
ask whether T can be interpreted in B even when LT and LB are the
same: The interpretation of the atomic vocabulary does not have to
be the identity function. But of course it can be, and in that case the
interpretation can take a very simple form, which we might call a pure
relativization: The only substantial part of the interpretation is the
relativization to a new domain. Many of the interpretations in which we
shall be interested are of this form.
Now, a couple definitions that apply (sensibly) only to non-finitely
axiomatized theories.
Definition. T is said to be locally interpretable in B if every finite subset
of T is intepretable in B.
Local interpretability obviously follows from interpretability, which is
also known as ‘global’ interpretability. The converse is not true. Local
interpretability is also transitive and reflexive, and it relates to relative
consistency just as global interpretability does: If T is locally inter-
pretable in B, then T is consistent if B is. The reason is that any proof of
a contradiction in T will use only finitely many of T ’s axioms.
As said above, Peano arithmetic is going to turn out to be something
of a special case. This is because PA is reflexive (Mostowski, 1952), in the
following sense.
Definition. T is reflexive if T proves the consistency of each of its finite
sub-theories.
PA’s reflexivity can cause all sorts of unexpected phenomena as regards
interpretability in PA. What will matter most to us here is the fact
that reflexive theories collapse the distinction between local and global
interpretability.
Theorem (Orey’s Theorem). Suppose that T is locally intepretable in B
and that B is reflexive. Then T is (globally) interpretable in B.
The proof of this result was first published in Feferman’s classic paper
“The Arithmetization of Metamathematics in a General Setting”, which
was also, of course, where the ‘unexpected phenomena’ just mentioned
first appeared.
2.2. Fragments of Arithmetic. As mentioned earlier, we are going
to be interested in the general question what happens when we add a
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truth-theory to some arbitrary theory T . In practice, however, we shall
mostly be concerned with PA and certain of its sub-theories. Let’s meet
them.
Robinson arithmetic, or Q, is the theory whose axioms are the univer-
sal closures of the following eight formulae:
Q1 Sx 6= 0
Q2 Sx = Sy → x = y
Q3 x+ 0 = x
Q4 x+ Sy = S(x+ y)
Q5 x× 0 = 0
Q6 x× Sy = (x× y) + x
Q7 x 6= 0→ ∃y(x = Sy)
Q8 x < y ≡ ∃z(y = Sz + x)
The last is often considered a definition of <; it is convenient in the
present context to regard < as just part of the language. The language of
Q, {0, S,+,×, <}, is what we shall call ‘the language of arithmetic’ and
denote: A.
Q is in many ways extremely weak. It fails to prove such obvious facts
as that x 6= Sx. But it is in other ways strong. For our purposes, the
crucial fact is that Q is strong enough to allow us to do Gödel numbering
and therefore some very basic syntax. For example, Q will allow us to
say and prove such things as that ‘0 = S0∧ 0 = SS0’ is the conjunction of
‘0 = S0’ and ‘0 = SS0’. Here’s the short version: Q is terrible at proving
generalizations, but it’s very good at proving particular facts.
A formula is said to be ∆0 (a.k.a., Σ0) if all quantifiers contained in
it are ‘bounded’, that is, if all of its quantified subformulae are of the
form ∀x(x < t → · · · ) or ∃x(x < t ∧ · · · ), where t is a term. These are
customarily abbreviated: ∀x < t(· · · ) and ∃x < t(· · · ). A formula is Σ1
(resp., Π1) if it is of the form ∃xφ (resp., ∀xφ), where φ is ∆0. A formula
is Σn (resp., Πn) if it is ∃xφ (resp., ∀xφ), where φ is Πn−1 (resp., Σn−1).
We can now say precisely how good Q is at proving particular facts: Q
proves all true Σ1 sentences of the language of arithmetic.
An important class of sub-theories of PA is characterized in terms of
the induction axioms these theories permit. PA itself is Q plus the full
induction scheme:
A(0) ∧ ∀x(A(x)→ A(Sx)→ ∀x(A(x)),
where A(x) is any formula at all. The theory IΘ is Q plus induction
for formulae in the set Θ: So A(x) has to be in Θ. Thus, I∆0 is Q plus
induction for ∆0 formulae, and IΣ1 is Q plus induction for Σ1 formulae.
I∆0 is in one sense clearly stronger than Q: It proves lots of important
generalizations about the natural numbers. But in another sense it is
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still a very weak theory: It is interpretable in Q.4 Another respect in
which I∆0 is weak is that, although one can define the relation y =
2x by means of a ∆0 formula exp(x, y), we cannot prove in I∆0 that
exponentiation is total; that is, we cannot prove: ∀x∃y(exp(x, y)). The
obvious proof uses by induction on ∃y(exp(x, y)), which is Σ1. But for
that very reason, the totality of exponentiation is provable in IΣ1, as is
the totality of every other primitive recursive function.5 So IΣ1 is much
stronger than I∆0: Indeed, IΣ1 proves Con(I∆0).
The final theory we shall need is known as I∆0 + ω1. Here, ω1(x) is a
certain function that, like 2x, is ∆0-definable but not I∆0-provably total.
The precise definition varies between authors, but one definition (Visser,
1991, p. 83) is:
ω1(x) = 2
|x|2
where |x| is the least y such that 2Sy > Sx. As said, the relation y = ω1(x)
can be defined by a ∆0 formula Ω1(x, y), and I∆0 + ω1 is then I∆0 plus
the formula asserting that this relation is total: ∀x∃y(Ω1(x, y)). The
interest of this theory lies in the fact that it is, as Visser puts it, “just
right for treating syntax”.6 And, like I∆0, it is interpretable in Q (Hájek
and Pudlák, 1993, p. 367).
As we shall see later, it is sometimes extremely helpful if our language
contains no terms other than variables. We shall therefore also want
to use what we might call the language of relational arithmetic. This
language contains predicate letters Z, P , A, and M in place of 0, S, +,
and ×. We shall therefore want axioms asserting that there is a unique
zero, and that P , A, and M are function-like:
Z ∃x(Zx ∧ ∀y(Zy → x = y))
P ∀x∃y(Pxy ∧ ∀z(Pxz → y = z))
A ∀x∀y∀z∃z(Axyz ∧ ∀w(Axyw → z = w))
M ∀x∀y∀z∃z(Axyz ∧ ∀w(Axyw → z = w))
It should be clear that theories in the usual language of arithmetic have
natural correlates in the language of relational arithmetic. We can thus
state a theory QR in this language, with much the same content as Q, by
simply adapting the axioms of Q itself. The first four axioms, for example,
would be:
QR1 ¬Px0
QR2 Pxz ∧ Pyz → x = y
4That I∆0 is locally interpretable in Q was first proven by Edward Nelson (1986).
That it is globally interpretable was proven by Alex Wilkie (Wilkie and Paris, 1987). The
proof is discussed both by Hájek and Pudlák (1993, pp. 366–70) and by Burgess (2005,
§2.2).
5Indeed, IΣ1 is proof-theoretically equivalent to primitive recursive arithmetic.
6Wilkie and Paris (1987) were the first to recognize the importance of I∆0 + ω1. One
has to use a more “efficient” coding than is customary, however, to get things to work.
Hajék and Pudlák (1993, pp. 303ff) give the details.
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QR3 Ax0x
QR4 (Pyz ∧Axzu) ∧ (Axyw ∧ Pwv)→ u = v
The first two conjuncts of QR4 say, in effect, that u = x + Sy; the next
two, that v = S(x+ y).
It should be clear that Q and QR are interpretable in one another, in
a very straightforward way. Similar things can be said about the other
theories mentioned.
3. THEORIES OF TRUTH
3.1. Formalizing Compositional Truth-theories. Since the seman-
tic axioms for the quantifiers, as Tarski bequeathed them to us, make use
of sequences of elements from the domain, we shall need a nice theory of
sequences if we’re to formalize theories of truth. Technically, we’ll need
our base theory to be sequential.
Definition. Let T be a theory that contains Q, either straightforwardly
or by interpretation. T is said to be sequential if, in short, it can code
finite sequences of its elements. More precisely, T is sequential if there
are formulae lh(s, h) and val(s, n, x) for which T proves:7
∃s(lh(s, 0))
∀s∀n{lh(s, n)→∀m < n∃x(val(s, n, x))}
∀s∀n{lh(s, n)→∀y∃t[lh(t, Sn)∧
∀z∀k < n(val(s, k, z) ≡ val(t, k, z))∧
val(t, n, z)]}
Here, lh(s, n) means: s is a sequence of length n; val(s, n, x) means: the
(n + 1)-st element of s is x. So the second of the principles says that
every sequence of length n has an element at each position below n; the
third says that each sequence can be extended by appending an arbitrary
element of the domain; the first assures us that there is a ‘null’ sequence
with which we can begin. We shall use ‘<>’ as a term denoting one of the
null sequences whose existence is so guaranteed.8
Q is not sequential, but there are lots of sequential theories that are
interpretable in Q. For example, I∆0 is sequential, and it is interpretable
in Q. More importantly, for our purposes, we can simply add a theory of
sequences to Q, by adding new predicates lh(s, n) and val(s, n, x), subject
to the principles that characterize sequential theories. This new theory,
which we might call Qseq, is interpretable in Q, since it is obviously
intepretable in any sequential theory. This fact will allow us to extend
7We can take ‘s is a sequence’ to be defined as: ∃n(lh(s, n)).
8In the cases in which we are interested, there generally will be such a term in the
language. If not, then we can conservatively extend whatever theory we are employing
by adding such a term, subject to the axiom: lh(<>, 0).
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our main results to Q, even though they do not apply to Q directly. Note,
morever, that every sequential theory interprets Q.9
It should be obvious that we can easily allow val(s, n, x) to have some
fixed value, say, 0, if n is beyond the length of s. That is: A theory that
contained an axiom to that effect would trivially be interpretable in one
that did not. So we shall assume this principle, as well, since it allows
us to pretend our sequences are infinite.
The theory of truth itself will consist of Tarski-style axioms for the
logical and non-logical vocabulary. The axioms for the logical part of the
language will always be the same:
v Denσ(vi, x) ≡ val(σ, i, x), where vi is the ith variable
= Satσ(pt = uq) ≡ ∃x∃y[Denσ(t, x) ∧Denσ(u, y) ∧ x = y]
¬ Satσ(p¬Aq) ≡ ¬Satσ(A)
∧ Satσ(pA ∧Bq) ≡ Satσ(A) ∧ Satσ(B)
∀ Satσ(p∀viA(vi)q) ≡ ∀τ [τ i∼ σ → Satσ(pA(vi)q)]
And similarly for the other logical constants.10 Here, ‘Denσ(t, x)’ means:
t denotes x with respect to the sequence σ; ‘Satσ(A)’ means: σ satisfies
A; and ‘τ i∼ σ’ means that τ and σ agree on what they assign to each
variable, with the possible exception of vi, i.e.:11
∃n < σ[lh(σ, n) ∧ ∀k < n(k 6= i→ ∀x(val(σ, k, x) ≡ val(τ, k, x))]
In the case of the language of arithmetic, we’ll also have these axioms
for the non-logical constants:
0 Denσ(‘0’, x) ≡ x = 0
S Denσ(pStq, x) ≡ ∃y(Denσ(t, y) ∧ y = Sx)
+ Denσ(pt+ uq, x) ≡ ∃y∃z[Denσ(t, y) ∧Denσ(u, z) ∧ x = y + z]
× Denσ(pt× uq, x) ≡ ∃y∃z[Denσ(t, y) ∧Denσ(u, z) ∧ x = y × z]
< Satσ(pt < uq) ≡ ∃y∃z[Denσ(t, y) ∧Denσ(u, z) ∧ y < z]
The pattern should be clear.12
In the case of the language of arithmetic, there are at least two sim-
plifications one often meets in practice. First, denotation is actually
definable in arithmetic in such a way that the clauses involving it can
be proven, so those clauses are often regarded as not really necessary.
9For lots of details on sequential theories, including the facts mentioned here, see
Visser’s “Pairs, Sets, and Sequences in First-order Theories” (Visser, 2008). Note that
we shall also need to use such facts as that the code of a sequence is always greater than
its length. We can always arrange for this sort of thing to be true.
10Of course, the other constants are definable in terms of the ones already mentioned,
but, in the present context, this is not a particularly interesting or important fact.
11It will be important below that this can be made to be ∆1. One way to see that
it can be is to note that lh(σ, ) and val(σ, i) are what Boolos (1993, pp. 24–7) calls ‘Σ
pterms’, and ∆1 formulas are closed under substitution of Σ pterms.
12It appears to have been Hao Wang (1952) who first worked out the details of this
sort of construction.
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Second, one can forego the use of sequences and instead treat quantifi-
cation substitutionally: ∀viA(vi) is true iff, for each n, A(n)—the result
of substituting the numeral for n for vi—is true. We shall avoid these
simplifications here, however. Both simplificiations are specific to the
language of arithmetic and are not available in general. We want our
results to extend smoothly and naturally to other cases, such as the
language of set theory.
Finally, then, we need to define the notion of truth itself. Tarski, as is
familiar, defines truth in terms of satisfaction by every sequence, thus:
T: T(A) ≡ A is a sentence ∧ ∀σSatσ(A)
Where we are discussing theories of truth over weak arithmetics, how-
ever, there is a worry about Tarski’s definition, namely, that it ‘hides’ a
quantifier in the definition of truth, so that elimination of that definition
can make a formula in which T(x) occurs logically more complex after
the elimination than it was before it.13 For this reason, it is sometimes
preferable to use an alternate definition:
T: T(A) ≡ A is a sentence ∧ Sat<>(A)
So, on this definition, truth is satisfaction by the null sequence. As
it happens, however, it is actually better, for our purposes, to use the
original definition, so we shall stick with it.
So, that’s what a theory of truth is. Here is some notation.
Definition. Let T be sequential. Then T T is the theory that extends T
by adding truth-theoretic axioms for the logical and non-logical vocabu-
lary of the language of T .
Note that T T does not extend any induction scheme that might be
present in T . There is no real chance, then, that T T is going to prove
the consistency of T . So one might suspect that T T would logically be no
stronger than T . If so, then, as we shall see, one would suspect wrongly,
at least in general. But we shall not be ready to prove that until Section
5.
First, however, let us note that T T is by no means a trivial extension
of T .
Lemma 3.1. T T is a materially adequate, fully compositional theory of
truth for the language of T . In particular: For each sentence A in the
language of T , T T proves: T(pAq) ≡ A.
Proof. A rigorous proof would be by induction on the complexity of sen-
tences of L. But this should be fairly obvious. A little experimentation
13Thanks to Cezary Cies´lin´ski for bringing this issue to my attention. As one example
of the problem, if we use Tarski’s definition, then T T (which will be defined shortly) will
in many cases not prove: T(p¬Aq) ≡ ¬T(pAq). The usual proof of this rests upon the
fact that, if A is a sentence, then ∀σSatσ(A) iff ∃σSatσ(A), and that in turn is normally
proven by an induction that may not be formalizable in T T .
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will reveal that proofs of ‘T-sentences’ need no more than is available in
Qseq: We’re not proving any general laws, just a bunch of particular facts,
and Q is very good at proving particular facts, no matter how bad it may
be at proving general laws. 
To put this differently: T T defines truth for sentences in the language
of T . Since T is sequential, it interprets Q, so we know from Tarski’s
indefinability theorem that T itself cannot define truth for all sentences
in the language of T . So T T is always expressively more powerful than
T .
Before we continue to explore T T , let me state a couple of obvious
corollaries of Lemma 3.1 that we shall need below.
Corollary 3.2. T T proves, of each axiom of T , that it is true.
Proof. Let A be an axiom of T . By Lemma 3.1, T T proves T(pAq) ≡ A.
Since T T obviously proves A, it proves T(pAq), too. 
The same, of course, goes for the theorems of T , but we shall not need
that fact.
Corollary 3.3. Let T be a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. Then
T T proves the formalization of “all axioms of T are true”.14
Note the contrast with Corollary 3.2: If T is infintely axiomatized,
there is no reason whatsoever to suspect that T T will prove that all
axioms of T are true, although it does prove that each axiom of T is true.
Indeed, we have the following.
Proposition 3.4. PAT does not prove that all axioms of PA are true.
This follows from Corollary 5.10, to be proven below, and it begins to
illustrate one of the senses in which PA is a special case.
3.2. Object-language versus Object-theory. I suspect that Lemma
3.1 will have surprised at least some people.15 If it didn’t, then maybe
this will.16
14Since T is sequential, it interprets Q, which means that we can develop enough
syntax in T to allow us to formalize “all axioms of T are true”.
15I’m cheating. I’ve already seen it surprise a fair number of people.
16Something close to this result is present in Wang’s paper “Truth Definitions and
Consistency” (Wang, 1952), though Wang is interested in definitions of truth, whereas
we are interested in theories of truth. What Wang shows (see his theorem 11) is that a
theory he calls S2, which is basically adjunctive set theory (see below) plus predicative
second-order quantification plus separation, defines truth for the language of set theory.
As he notes, the result could be improved “if we could develop number theory in S2
without using” separation. At the time, it was not known that this could be done, but the
interpretability of Q in adjunctive set theory would soon be proven by Tarski, Mostowski,
and Robinson (1953).
In any event, I do not claim originality for this result. As we shall see, it was to
become fairly well known but a few years after Wang’s work. But it has not been widely
appreciated among philosophers.
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Corollary 3.5. QseqT is a materially adequate, fully compositional theory
of truth for the language of arithmetic.
As mentioned earlier, it is at least tempting to try to interpret Tarski’s
claim that the metalanguage must be ‘essentially richer’ than the object
langauge (Tarski, 1944, p. 354) in terms of logical strength.17 Some
people seem to think that having a theory of truth for the language
of arithmetic means being able to prove that PA is consistent. Better
informed people know that you can have a theory of truth without ex-
tending induction. But even some of them seem to think that a theory
of truth for the language of arithmetic must be at least as strong as PA,
and that this is something we learned from Tarski. What Corollary 3.5
shows is that this is just false. If that’s surprising, it’s probably because
one is thinking of theories of truth as if their subject-matter were not
languages but theories. But there is no such thing as ‘a truth-theory
for PA’. There is only a theory of truth for the language of PA, that is,
for the language of arithmetic. The question whether such a theory is
materially adequate is the question whether it allows us to prove the
T-sentence for each sentence of the language it concerns. And QseqT is
perfectly capable of proving all the T-sentences for the language of PA,
that is, for the language of arithmetic.
The point is not specific to arithmetic. Consider, for example, the
theory known as ‘adjunctive set theory’ or, following Visser, ‘WS’ (for
‘weak’ set theory). Its axioms are:
Null set: ∃x∀y(y /∈ x)
Adjunction: ∀x∀y∃z∀w(w ∈ z ≡ w ∈ x ∨ w = y)
WS is interpretable in Q, and it is, in a sense, the weakest sequential
theory (Visser, 2008). But now consider WST . It is easy to see that WST
proves a T-sentence for each sentence of the language of set theory. That
is: WST is a materially adequate theory of truth for the language of
set theory. So, if you were tempted to say that a theory of truth for ZF
cannot be developed in any theory weaker than ZF itself, you might want
to reconsider.
One might think I am being uncharitable. There is a perfectly natural
interpretation of what people mean when they speak of ‘a theory of truth
for PA’. What they mean is: A materially adequate theory of truth for
the language of arithmetic in which it is possible to prove that each of
the axioms of PA is true.18 And if that’s what a theory of truth for PA
is, then it’s true that a materially adequate theory of truth for PA can
only be developed in a theory at least as strong as PA. But this fact is
completely trivial and isn’t anything we needed Tarski to teach us. Each
17See the exchange between DeVidi and Solomon (1999) and Ray (2005).
18This is what Wang (1952, p. 244) calls a ‘normal’ truth-theory.
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axiom of PA will follow from (i) its T-sentence and (ii) the statement that
it is true.
T(A) ≡ A T-sentence
T(A) Each axiom is true
A Logic
The lesson I propose we should learn from Corollary 3.5 is thus this:
Tarski’s theorem on the indefinability of truth has nothing to do with
logical strength. It has all and only to do with expressive power.19 This
should have been obvious already. The reason you cannot develop a
truth-theory for the language of PA inside PA itself is not that PA isn’t
strong enough. Tarski’s indefinability theorem applies even to ‘true
arithmetic’—to the theory whose ‘axioms’ are all the arithmetical truths—
and true arithmetic is not only stronger than ZFC but is stronger than
any consistent formal theory.20 But Corollary 3.5 reinforces this point,
since it tells us that you can develop a theory of truth for the language
of PA in QseqT , a theory whose consistency is provable not just in PA
but already in IΣ1, and in weaker theories still.21 What distinguishes
Qseq
T from PA is the fact that the the language of the former is more
expressive than the language of the latter, in the precise sense that there
are sets that are definable in QseqT that are not definable in PA. The set
of (Gödel numbers of) true sentences of the language of arithmetic is the
salient example.
If this point has not been widely appreciated, Tarski is partly to blame.
The central task of section 4 of “The Concept of Truth in Formalized
Languages” is to explain how to generalize the definition of truth that
Tarski had given (in the previous section of that paper) for the language
of the calculus of classes. And so Tarski first “undertake[s]. . . the con-
struction of a corresponding meta-language and the establishment of a
meta-theory which forms the proper field of investigation” (Tarski, 1958,
p. 210). After explaining what the meta-language must contain (we’ll
discuss that below), he writes:
. . . [T]he full axiom system of the meta-theory includes
three groups of sentences: (1) axioms of a general logical
kind; (2) axioms which have the same meaning as the
axioms of the science under investigation or are logically
19A similar point is made by Ray (2005), but the results here make it clear just how
great the gap is between these two ways of understanding Tarski’s claim.
20Proof: Let T be a formal theory. Then the statement that T is consistent can
be formalized in arithmetic; if it is true, then true arithmetic of course proves it. So
true arithmetic proves Con(T ), for every consistent formal theory T . Moreover, by the
arithmetized completeness theorem, true arithmetic interprets every consistent formal
theory.
21We’ll see shortly that QseqT is mutually interpretable with Q+ Con(Qseq), which is
itself mutually interpretable with Q+ Con(Q).
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stronger than them, but which in any case suffice. . . for the
establishment of all sentences having the same meaning
as the theorems of the science being investigated; finally,
(3) axioms which determine the fundamental properties
of the primitive concepts of a structural-descriptive type
[that is, of syntax]. (Tarski, 1958, p. 211)
Note how Tarski speaks, at (2), of “the science under investigation”. In
a way, this is fine: If Tarski wants to investigate certain sciences—that
is, theories—he’s welcome to do so, and of course there are plenty of
interesting results to be proved about theories using the techniques
Tarski developed. (For example, using those techniques, we can prove
that PA is consistent.) It is because Tarski thinks of ‘sciences’, rather
than languages, as the object of investigation that, at (2), he includes
(translations of) the axioms of the object-theory among those of the meta-
theory. As applied to the sort of case we have been discussing, what this
means is that the meta-theory in which Tarski proposes to develop a
definition of truth suitable for use in investigations of PA will have to
include either the axioms of PA themselves or else something sufficient
for proving them.
But what has not been clearly appreciated, it seems to me, is that the
axioms of PA need to be included among the axioms of the meta-theory
only in so far as we want to prove certain results about PA specifically. If
our goal is simply a materially adequate theory of truth for the language
of PA, that is, for the language of arithmetic, then we have no need of
(most of) those axioms. Whether Tarski himself appreciated this point
in the 1930s, I do not know. But it was known to logicians no later than
1952, when it was used by Kleene (1952). We’ll look at Kleene’s argument
in Section 6.1 or rather, at a later reformulation of it.
4. CUTS AND CONSISTENCY
The question I now want to address is this: What does adding a truth-
theory give us, as far as logical strength is concerned? It is obvious that
T T is at least as strong as T , since it contains T . But is it any stronger
than T ?
There is no perfectly general answer to this question. What we shall
see, however, is that, if T is finitely axiomatized, then T T is stronger
than T , in the sense that T T is not interpretable in T . The proof uses
a method called ‘shortening of cuts’ which is due to Robert Solovay and
which plays a major role in the study of models of arithmetic. Since this
method is not widely known among philosophers, I shall spend some
time introducing it.
4.1. The Method of Cuts. Let T be an arithmetical theory that does
not have full induction, in the sense that there are formulae with the
form of induction axioms that are not theorems of T . Then there are
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almost sure to be formulae φ(x) for which T proves the hypotheses of the
relevant induction axiom—φ(0) and ∀x(φ(x)→ φ(Sx))—but for which T
does not prove its conclusion: ∀xφ(x).22 Obviously, T will therefore prove
φ(0), φ(1), φ(2), and so forth. So, from the point of view of T , φ(x) is a
formula that is true of 0, 1, 2, and so on, but that is, for all T knows, false
of some natural numbers. And, by the completeness theorem, there will
be models of T in which φ(x) is not true of all of the ‘natural numbers’.
For example, as is well-known, Q does not prove that no number is its
own successor. But Q does prove both 0 6= S0, which follows immediately
from the first axiom of Q, and x 6= Sx→ Sx 6= SSx, which follows just as
immediately from the second. So x 6= Sx is the kind of formula Russell
called ‘inductive’, and that terminology has been adapted to the present
context.
Definition. A formula ι(x) is said to be inductive in T if
(1) T ` ι(0)
(2) T ` ∀x(ι(x)→ ι(Sx)).
Inductive formulas can be used to establish results about interpretabil-
ity. The crucial result is this one.
Theorem 4.1. Let ι(x) be a formula that is inductive in T ⊇ Q and that
is no worse than Π1. Then T interprets Q+ ∀x(ι(x)).
It’s not essential for what follows that the reader understand the proof
of this theorem, so I shall not present it in any detail. But the method
used in its proof—the shortening of cuts—is one we shall need below, so
it is worth having some sense for how it works. I shall therefore explain
the ideas behind the proof of Theorem 4.1 by continuing to discuss the
example already mentioned: We’ll see how to prove that Q interprets
Q+ ∀x(x 6= Sx).
The basic idea is simply to restrict the domain to the numbers that
satisfy x 6= Sx—which, one might say, might as well be the natural
numbers, so far as Q is concerned. But that isn’t quite right. The
problem is that we do not, in general, know that the numbers satisfying
an inductive formula constitute an initial segment of all the numbers
there are. The ‘real’ natural numbers will all satisfy ι(x), but then there
may be some that don’t and then some more that do after the ones that
don’t. So if we want a formula that might play the role of a ‘new domain’,
then we need a slightly different notion, the notion of a cut.
Definition. A formula ι(x) is a cut in a theory T if
(1) ι(x) is inductive in T
(2) T ` ∀x[ι(x)→ ∀y < x(ι(y))]
22In the case of IΣn, one can actually exhibit such a formula (Hájek and Pudlák,
1993, p. 172). But note that, if there were no such cases, then the fact that the induction
axiom was missing wouldn’t cost us anything.
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If T does not prove ∀x(ι(x)), then ι(x) is said to be a proper cut in T .
The numbers satisfying a formula that is a cut in T will constitute an
initial segment of T ’s natural numbers, and if the cut is proper, there
will be models in which they constitute a proper initial segment.
The crucial result relating inductive formulas and cuts is this one.
Lemma 4.2 (Hájek and Pudlák 1993, p. 368). Let ι(x) be inductive in
T ⊇ Q. Then there is a cut κ(x) in T for which T ` ∀x(κ(x)→ ι(x)). That
is: Every inductive formula can be shortened to a cut.
Proof. The obvious idea is to consider ∀y ≤ x(ι(x)) and to show that it
defines a cut. Unfortunately, this doesn’t quite work. The problem is that
the proof that the formula in question defines a cut needs the transitivity
of ≤, and Q does not prove that ≤ is transitive.
This obstacle can be overcome, however, and the way in which this is
done is a nice illustration of how the shortening of cuts works: We can
simply restrict our attention to numbers for which ≤ is transitive. In
particular, we first consider the formula:
χ(x)
df≡ ι(x) ∧ ∀y∀z(y ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y → z ≤ x)
χ(x) says roughly that x satisfies ι(x) and that ≤ is transitive below x.
It’s easy to see that Q proves: χ(x) is inductive if ι(x) is.
We can then pursue the original idea, but with χ(x) in place of ι(x):
κ(x)
df≡ ∀w < x(χ(w))
The verification that this defines a cut is left to the reader. 
So, although Q can’t prove that x 6= Sx is a cut, there is a ‘subcut’
κ(x) of x 6= Sx in Q. So we might now try simply restricting attention
to κ(x), the thought being that this will give us an interpretation in
which x 6= Sx holds and in which the axioms of Q just keep right on
holding. But this doesn’t quite work, either, the reason being that we
need to ensure that the domain of our interpretation is closed under the
operations of succession, addition, and multiplication. That it is closed
under S follows from the fact that κ(x) is inductive. But we have no
reason at this point to think we can prove either of these:
∀x∀y(κ(x) ∧ κ(y)→ κ(x+ y))
∀x∀y(κ(x) ∧ κ(y)→ κ(x× y))
What to do?
The answer is to use the method of cuts to restrict attention to numbers
that do have sums and products.23 Doing so allows us to prove the
following.
23There is an accessible treatment in Burgess’s book Fixing Frege (Burgess, 2005,
§2.2).
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Lemma 4.3. If T ⊇ Q, then every formula ι(x) inductive in T can be
shortened to a cut κ(x) on which T proves the relativizations of the axioms
of Q.
We can now see how Theorem 4.1 follows from Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Start with a very simple case: x 6= Sx. We want
to see that Q interprets Q + ∀x(x 6= Sx). Since x 6= Sx is inductive in
Q, by Lemma 4.3, there is a subcut κ(x) of x 6= Sx on which Q proves
the relativizations of the axioms of Q. Our interpretation is thus a ‘pure
relativization’ to κ(x). So we need only show that Q proves
∀x(κ(x)→ x 6= Sx).
But of course it does, since that says, precisely, that κ(x) is a subcut of
x 6= Sx.
So now consider the case where ι(x) is ∆0. By Lemma 4.3, there is a
subcut δ(x) of ι(x) on which T proves the relativizations of the axioms
of Q. So now we just have to check that T proves the relativization of
∀x(ι(x)). This is not as straightforward as in the previous case, because
now there are quantifiers in ι(x) that themselves have to be relativized.
But ι(x) is ∆0, which means that the quantifiers in ι(x) are all bounded,
and that means that the relativization is redundant, in the sense that,
if ι(x) is ∆0 and δ(x) is a cut in T , then ∀x(δ(x) → ι(x)) is going to be
T -provably equivalent to ∀x(δ(x)→ ι∗(x)), where ι∗(x) is the relativiza-
tion of ι(x) to δ(x).24 The proof is by induction on the complexity of
expressions, of course, but the basic idea is simple enough. Consider, for
example, ∀y < t(φ(y)). This is relativized as: ∀y < t(δ(y)→ φ(t)). Since
δ(x) is T -provably closed under S, +, and ×, t, whatever it may be, is
T -provably going to satisfy δ(x), whence, since δ(x) is a cut, we have
that y < t→ δ(y), and the new condition is redundant. Similarly for the
existential case.
So suppose ι(x) is Π1; say it is ∀yφ(x, y), where φ(x, y) is ∆0. Then
what we need to show is that T proves
∀x[δ(x)→ ∀y(δ(y)→ φ∗(x, y))]
As we just saw, T will prove
∀y(δ(y)→ φ(x, y)) ≡ ∀y(δ(y)→ φ∗(x, y)),
so we need only show that T proves
∀x[δ(x)→ ∀y(δ(y)→ φ(x, y))].
But we already know that T proves the stronger: ∀x[δ(x)→ ∀y(φ(x, y))],
since δ(x) is a subcut of ∀y(φ(x, y)) in T . 
24Burgess (2005, pp. 101–4) again has a nice discussion of this sort of point.
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It is not in general true that, if ι(x) is a Σ1 cut in T ⊇ Q, then T
interprets Q + ∀x(ι(x)). The standard counterexample is ∃y(exp(x, y)).
This is inductive even in Q, but Q does not interpret Q+ ∀x∃y(exp(x, y)).
It does not follow, however, that the method of shortening cuts only
works with Π1 formulae. Sometimes one can show, by other means, that
T proves the relativization of some Σ1 formula.
As it happens, shortening of cuts can be used to prove stronger forms
of Lemma 4.3 and so of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.4. If T ⊇ Q, then every formula ι(x) inductive in T can be
shortened to a cut κ(x) on which T proves the relativizations of the axioms
of I∆0, and even of I∆0 + ω1.
We’ll need this stronger result below.
4.2. The Unprovability of ‘Small’ Consistency. We know from Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem that no ‘sufficiently strong’ theory proves
its own consistency. In the mid-1980s, Pavel Pudlák proved a beautiful
version of Gödel’s result, one that really ought to be better known. If we
think of the numbers satisfying a cut as ‘small’ numbers,25 then what
the theorem says is that no theory containing Q can prove that there are
no ‘small’ proofs of contradictions from its axioms. More formally, then,
what Pudlák’s theorem says is that no theory containing Q proves its
own consistency ‘on a cut’.
Theorem 4.5 (Pudlák 1985, Theorem 2.1). Suppose T ⊇ Q is consistent,
and let κ(x) be a cut in T . Then T does not prove:26
∀x(κ(x)→ ¬BewT (x, p0 = S0q))
Moreover, this continues to hold even if κ(x) is merely inductive, since it
can always be shortened to a cut.
This is a substantial strengthening of Gödel’s result, in three respects.
First, the usual form of the second incompleteness theorem applies only
to theories containing enough induction to prove the Hilbert-Bernays-
Gödel-Löb derivability conditions. Pudlák’s theorem, by contrast, applies
to any theory containing Q. Second, Gödel’s result tells us only that
T cannot show that there are no proofs of contradictions, and this is
compatible with T ’s being able to show that there are no ‘small’ proofs of
contradictions.
The third resepct emerges from the following consequence of Theorem
4.5.
Theorem 4.6 (Pudlák 1985, Corollary 3.5). Suppose T is finitely axiom-
atized, sequential, and consistent. Then T does not interpret Q+ Con(T ).
25If it sounds as if there are connections here with Wang’s paradox, there are.
26Here, BewT (x, y) is an appropriate formalization of ‘x is a T -proof of y’.
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Whereas Gödel tells us that T cannot prove Con(T ), Pudlák tells us
that, if T is finitely axiomatized, it cannot even interpret Q+ Con(T ), let
alone T + Con(T ).27
The proofs of these two results are (well) beyond the scope of the
present discussion.28
Putting these together, we have:29
Corollary 4.7. Let S ⊇ Q be a consistent, finitely axiomatizable sequen-
tial theory that proves Con(T ) on a cut. Then S is not interpretable in
T .
Proof. If S proves the consistency of T on a cut, then by 4.1 it will
interpret Q+ Con(T ). But if S were interpretable in T , then Q+ Con(T )
would be interpretable in T . 
It is Corollary 4.7 that will do much of the work below.
5. THE STRENGTH OF TRUTH-THEORIES
5.1. T T is Stronger than T . We are now ready to prove our first main
result.30
Theorem 5.1. Let T ⊇ I∆0 + ω1 and suppose that T T proves that all
axioms of T are true. Then T T proves the consistency of T on a cut and
so is not interpretable in T .
The natural proof of this needs to use I∆0 + ω1 because, as I said
earlier, it is only here that we can do syntax naturally. We’ll see later
that this assumption can be weakened.
The key to the proof is the realization that we can almost mimic the
‘trivial’ proof of the consistency of T that we learned from Tarski. That
proof proceeds as follows: First, we show that all the axioms are true;
then we show that the rules of inference preserve truth; then we conclude,
by induction, that all theorems are true. Since ‘0 = S0’ is not true, it isn’t
a theorem, so T is consistent.
27Feferman (1960, p. 76, theorem 6.5) proved an antecedent of Pudlák’s result: If
PA ⊆ T , then T does not interpret T + Con(T ), assuming that the axioms of T are
represented by a Σ1 formula.
28As well as the paper of Pudlák’s already cited, the interested reader may con-
sult Hajék and Pudlák (1993, pp. 173ff); see also Visser’s recent paper on the second
incompleteness theorem (Visser, 2009a).
29Exercise: Show that we do not have to assume that T is consistent.
30The results reported in this section were taught to me by Albert Visser, though the
proofs are my own, and the complications we shall meet arose as I tried to work out the
details. There is a result very similar in feel to Corollary 5.6 in a recent paper of his
(Visser, 2009a, theorem 4.1). Note that Corollary 5.6 leads to an alterative statement of
Theorem 4.4 of that paper, which is the characterization of consistency statements that
is its central purpose. This version relies upon coding, however, which is part of what
Visser is trying to avoid. We will prove related results below, Theorem 6.5 and Corollary
6.13, that do not have this flaw.
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This won’t work in the present case, of course, because we do not have
‘semantic induction’, that is, induction for formulae containing semantic
vocabulary. But we could overcome that lack by the method of cuts if we
could show that ‘n line proofs have true conclusions’ is inductive. Then
we would have that, although T T does not prove Con(T ), it does prove it
on a cut.
If that were the only obstacle, the proof would be easy. Unfortunately,
there is another. We’re just assuming, at present, that T T can prove that
all of T ’s non-logical axioms are true. But, to mimic Tarski’s proof, we
also need to prove that all the logical axioms are true and that the rules
of inference are truth-preserving. This turns out to be more difficult
than one might suppose. It helps to assume that the logic in which we’re
working is formulated as an axiomatic system rather than a natural
deduction system, with just two rules of inference: modus ponens and
universal generalization. This allows us to speak simply in terms of the
truth of the various lines of a proof, rather than in terms of whether the
formula on a given line follows from the premises on which that line
depends.31
The propositional axioms are easy enough.32 Consider, for example,
p → (q → p). Let A and B be formulae. Using the clause for → twice,
Satσ(pA→ (B → A)q) iff Satσ(A) → (Satσ(B) → Satσ(A)). But the lat-
ter is of course a logical truth. So, generalizing, for any A and B, and
for all σ, Satσ(pA→ (B → A)q), which is to say that all instances of
p→ (q → p) are true.
The propositional rule, modus ponens, is also easy. What we need to
show is that, if both A and A → B are satisfied by all sequences, then
so is B. If ∀σSatσ(pA→ Bq), then, by the clause for the conditional:
∀σ(Satσ(A) → Satσ(B)). But then, by logic: ∀σSatσ(A) → ∀σSatσ(B).
So, if ∀σSatσ(A), then ∀σSatσ(B).
Unfortunately, we run into problems with quantification. (Don’t we
always.) Consider universal instantiation, the simplest formulation of
which is:
∀vi(φvi)→ φvj ,
subject to the usual restrictions. The argument for its truth proceeds
as follows. Suppose some sequence σ does not satisfy some instance.
Then, by the clause for→, we have Satσ(∀vi(φvi)) and ¬Satσ(φvj). Now
consider a sequence that is just like σ, except that what it assigns to
vi is whatever σ assigns to vj . So τ
i∼ σ, and hence Satτ (φvi). But
31The difficulty presented by a natural deduction system is that the correctness of a
line then involves the consequent’s being satisfied by all sequences if all the premises are,
and this introduces more logical complexity than we have with the axiomatic treatment.
32Assuming we define truth as Tarski did, in terms of satisfaction by all sequences.
If we use the alternate definition, and say that a line is true iff its universal closure is
satisifed by <>, then we find ourselves needing to prove: ∀σ(Satσ(A)) ≡ Sat<>(ucl(A)).
That only adds to our problems.
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since (i) vi stands in φvi only where vj stands in φvj and (ii) τ assigns vi
the same value that σ assigns vj , then we must have ¬Satτ (φvi), since
¬Satσ(φvj). Contradiction. In making this last move, however, we are
appealing to a general principle concerning ‘variable-switching’, one we
might formulate as: If φvj results from replacing all free occurrences of
vi in φvi by vj , and if τ is just like σ but sets τi = σj , then Satσ(φvj) iff
Satσ(φvi).33 There is clearly no hope of proving this without ‘semantic’
induction.
The problem is all the more serious if we allow instantiation not just
by variables but by arbitrary terms and so formulate UI in the form:
∀vi(φvi)→ φt
(And we will have to face this problem, one way or another, if our lan-
guage does indeed contain terms that are not variables.) In that case,
the proof also requires the claim that all terms denote.
There are similar problems concerning universal generalization:
A→ φ(vi) ` A→ ∀viφ(vi),
where of course A must not contain ‘x’ free. Suppose that A→ ∀viφ(vi)
is not satisfied by all sequences. Then there is a sequence σ such that
Satσ(A) and ¬Satσ(∀viφ(vi)). By the clause for ∀, then, we have a se-
quence τ i∼ σ such that ¬Satτ (φ(vi)). Since vi is not free in A, then,
Satτ (A), as well. But how do we know that? Because whether a for-
mula is satisfied by a sequence depends only upon what is assigned to
variables that occur free in that formula, viz.:
∀i(free-in(A, vi)→ ∀x(val(σ, i, x) ≡ val(τ, i, x))→ Satσ(A) ≡ Satτ (A)
But not will we be able to prove this without semantic induction.34
Careful examination of the proofs that the logical axioms are true and
the rules are truth-preserving shows that those proofs need the following
semantic claims.
(1) If φt is the result of replacing all free occurrences of vi in φvi with
t, and if Denσ(t, a) and ∀k 6= i(val(τ, k) = val(σ, k) ∧ val(τ, i) = a,
then, Satσ(φt) iff Satτ (φvi).
(2) Suppose that σ and τ agree on all free variables contained in A.
Then Satσ(A) iff Satτ (A).
The proofs of these depend upon the corresponding claims for terms:
(3) If u(t) is the result of replacing all occurrences of vi in u(vi)
with t, and if ∀k 6= i(τk = σk) ∧ τi = σj , then Denσ(u(t), a) iff
Denτ (u(vi), a).
33Note that φvj does not contain vi free.
34This particular issue can be avoided if we reformulate our truth-theory so that a
sequence satisfies a formula only if it assigns values to all and only the variables free
in that formula. This complicates the statement of the theory, however, and it does not
help with our other problems.
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(4) Suppose that σ and τ agree on all free variables contained in t.
Then Denσ(t, a) iff Denτ (t, a).
We also need:
(5) For every term t, ∃x(Denσ(t, x)),
though this will be trivial if there are no terms in the language other
than variables.
We thus have no hope whatsoever of showing that T T proves that
‘logic is true’, i.e., that the logical axioms are all true and that the rules
of inference are truth-preserving. All is not lost, however, because we
can use the method of cuts. The idea is to show that, though T T does not
prove the listed semantic principles, it does prove their relativizations to
some cut. Then it will follow that any formula that is on the cut and is
an instance of a logical axiom is true, and any rule of inference involving
only formulae on the cut will be truth-preserving. And that will allow us
to show that there can be no T -proof of a contradiction on that cut.
Consider, for example:
(1*) For all σ and τ , if φt is of complexity < n and is the result of
replacing all occurrences of vi in φvi with t, and if Denσ(t, a) and
∀k 6= i(τk = σk) ∧ τi = a, then Satσ(φt) iff Satτ (φvi).
The usual proof of (1) can be adapted to show that (1*) is inductive. There
are similar formulae corresponding to (2)–(4), and the usual proofs of
them can also be adapted to show that their ‘starred versions’ are induc-
tive. The case of (5) is more complicated, however. The corresponding
inductive formula is:
(5*) If t is of complexity < n, then ∃x(Denσ(t, x)).
In the case of the language of arithmetic, this will certainly be inductive.
But if we were to add expressions to the language for fast growing
functions, then we might have difficulty keeping the value of the term
in the cut, so to speak. The problem can be side-stepped, however, by
considering, in the first instance, only purely relational languages, such
as the langauge of relational arithmetic. Then, as mentioned earlier, (5)
is trivial.
We first prove Theorem 5.1, then, for the special case of relational
languages.
Theorem 5.2. Let T ⊇ I∆0+ω1, where LT is relational, and suppose that
T T proves that all axioms of T are true. Then T T proves the consistency
of T on a cut and so is not interpretable in T .
Proof. As noted, the usual proofs of (1)–(4) can be adapted to show that
their starred versions are inductive, so, by Lemma 4.4, T T proves their
relativizations to some cut on which it also proves the axioms of I∆0 +ω1.
What we now do is ‘work on this cut’, as it is said: Relativizing everything
to the cut, we can prove the relativization of ‘logic is true’ on the cut. On
that cut, we will be able to prove that ‘n line proofs have true conclusions’
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is inductive and will therefore be able to construct a cut on which the
relativization of ‘for all n, n line proofs have true conclusions’ is true.
The relativization of ‘all theorems of T are true’ to that cut will then be
provable, and so we will be able to prove the consistency of T on that cut.
To fill in a little detail, consider a formula φ(n) that says: if n is
the Gödel number of a proof such that (i) n lies in our cut and (ii) every
formula in the proof also lies in this cut, then (iii) every formula occurring
in the proof is true. I.e., if we let λ(x) be a formula describing the cut on
which logic is true, then φ(n) is:
BewT (n) ∧ λ(n) ∧ ∀m < len(n)(λ(nm))→
∀m < len(n)(T(nm))
The second conjunct will often be redundant, given the usual sorts of
Gödel numberings: If n lies in the cut, then the Gödel numbers of the
formulae occurring in the proof it codes will be ≤ n. But of course it
cannot hurt to include it.
Now consider:
∀k ≤ n(φ(k))
The usual argument can be used to show that this is inductive, since all
the formulas involved here lie in our cut, and logic is true on that cut.
We therefore have a cut κ(x) on which ∀k ≤ n(φ(k)) holds. I.e., we can
prove:
∀n{κ(n)→
∀k ≤ n[λ(k) ∧ BewT (k) ∧ ∀m < len(k)(λ(km))→
∀m < len(k)(T(km))]}
Taking k to be n, we have:
∀n{κ(n) ∧ λ(n) ∧ BewT (n) ∧ ∀m < len(n)(λ(nm))→
∀m < len(n)(T(nm))}
What we want is:
∀n{κ(n) ∧ BewT (n)→ ∀m < len(n)(T(nm))}(*)
We thus need to eliminate the other conjuncts of the antecedent by
showing that those two conjuncts:
(i) λ(n) and (ii) ∀m < len(n)(λ(nm))
follow from the other two: κ(n) and BewT (n). For the first, by construc-
tion, κ(x) is a sub-cut of λ(x). For (2), we need only make sure that λ(x)
satisfies:
seq(n)→ ∀m < len(n)(nm < n)
We can do this simply by making sure that the axioms of, say, I∆0 are
true on λ(x), or we could build this condition directly into λ(x).
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From (*), then, we easily derive
∀n∀m{κ(n) ∧ BewT (n,m)→ T(m)}
and so:
∀n{κ(n)→ ¬BewT (n, p0 = 1q}
So T is consistent on κ(x). 
With Theorem 5.2 in hand, we can extend the result to non-relational
languages and so establish Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let TR be the relational version of T . What we
are going to see is that TRT is interpretable in T T . It is easy enough to
interpret T in TR, of course, via such translations as:
r(pAxyzq) = px+ y = zq
But, of course, that is not all we need to do. We need to interpret
the semantics of the relational language in that of the non-relational
language. But this is fairly easy to do. The idea is just to translate
Satσ(A) as Satσ(r(A)), where r(x) is a formula of the language of T that
expresses the translation from LTR to LT .35 And since r(x) commutes
with the logical connectives, proving the translations of the semantic
axioms for the connectives will be easy. For example, the translation of
Satσ(pA ∧Bq) ≡ Satσ(A) ∧ Satσ(B)
is
Satσ(r(pA ∧Bq)) ≡ Satσ(r(A)) ∧ Satσ(r(B))
But r(pA ∧Bq) just is pr(A) ∧ r(B)q. And since we did not relativize the
interpretation, the case of quantification is no harder.
The clauses for the non-logical constants are also easy. Consider, for
example, that for Axyz, which is essentially:
Satσ(pAvivjvkq) ≡ Aσiσjσk
Its translation is:
Satσ(r(pAvivjvkq)) ≡ (σi + σj = σk)
But r(pAvivjvkq) is vi + vj = vk, so this becomes:
Satσ(pvi + vj = vkq) ≡ (σi + σj = σk)
which is easily provable.
So TRT is interpretable in T T . But TRT proves Con(TR) on a cut and
so interprets Q + Con(TR) and, in fact, interprets I∆0 + ω1 + Con(TR).
But I∆0 +ω1 is strong enough to verify the fact that T is interpretable in
35Since the translation is recursive, it will of course be representable in T . In general,
of course, it will be represented by some formula R(x, y), not by a function like r(x). But
this point affects nothing that follows and only complicates the exposition. (We probably
do need to know that every formula has exactly one translation. But I∆0 + ω1 will prove
such facts.)
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TR and so to prove that, if Con(TR), then Con(T ). So I∆0 + ω1 + Con(TR)
actually proves Con(T ), whence I∆0 + ω1 + Con(T ), and so of course
Q+ Con(T ), is interpretable in TRT and so in T T . 
Theorem 5.3. Let T ⊇ Q and suppose that T T proves that all axioms of
T are true. Then T T proves the consistency of T on a cut.
Proof. Start the proofs of the preceding theorems by restricting every-
thing to a cut on which the axioms of I∆0 + ω1 are available. 
Corollary 5.4. Suppose T ⊇ Q is finitely axiomatized. Then T T is not
interpretable in T .
Proof. From Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 3.3. 
Theorem 5.5. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory in a finite language.
Then Q+ Con(T ) interprets T T .
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 6.12 below,
but harder, since Q is so weak. See Visser’s paper “The Predicative Frege
Hierarchy” for the details (Visser, 2009b). 
Corollary 5.6. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory in a finite language.
Then Q+ Con(T ) is mutually interpretable with T T .
So there is a straightforward sense in which a ‘full truth-theory’ is a
sort of functor that strengthens any finitely axiomatized theory you feed
it. We’ll see some similar, but much more general, results below.
There is one more result I want to mention before we continue.
Theorem 5.7. (I∆0 + ω1)T is interpretable in QT .
We will not actually need this result for anything that follows, but the
proof seems to me to be of substantial interest. The technique involved
will be familiar from the proof of Theorem 5.1, but it is applied more
subtly. It will be clear, too, that it is not special to this particular case.
What it shows, in effect, is that we can always relativize the semantic
part of a theory like QT to a cut.
Proof. We know, of course, that we can interpret I∆0 + ω1 in Q. The
problem is to do so while preserving the semantic part of QT . We cannot
actually expect (I∆0 + ω1)T to prove the relativizations of the semantic
axioms of QT . That would mean, in particular, proving the relativization
of the clause for ∃, which would be:
κ(σ)→ Satσ(p∃viφviq) ≡ ∃τ [κ(τ) ∧ τ i∼ σ ∧ Satτ (pφviq)],
This says, in effect, that ∃viφvi is true iff there is a number in the cut
that satisfies φvi, which is, in general, false. But what we can do is re-
interpret satisfaction itself so that Satσ(A) means: the relativization of
A is satisfied by σ. That is, we translate Satσ(A) as: Satσ(tκ(A)), where
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tκ(x) is a syntactic function meaning: the relativization of A to κ(x).36
So what we need to prove is:
κ(σ)→ Satσ(tκ(p∃viφviq)) ≡ ∃τ [κ(τ) ∧ τ i∼ σ ∧ Satτ (tκ(pφviq))].
Now, tκ(p∃viφviq) is ∃vi(κ(vi) ∧ tκ(φvi)), so this becomes:
κ(σ)→ Satσ(p∃vi(κ(vi) ∧ tκ(φvi))q) ≡ ∃τ [κ(τ) ∧ τ i∼ σ ∧ Satτ (tκ(pφviq))].
This, however, is easily proven.
Left to right: By the clauses for ∃ and ∧, Satσ(p∃vi(κ(vi) ∧ tκ(φvi))q) iff
∃τ [τ i∼ σ∧Satτ (pκ(vi)q)∧Satτ (tκ(pφviq))]. But κ(vi) is a specific formula,
and so we can prove a Sat-sentence for it. In particular, we have:
T T ` Satτ (pκ(vi)q) ≡ κ(τi)
But if κ(τi), then, since κ(σ), also κ(τ). That is: If a sequence is in the cut,
and some number is in the cut, then the sequence we get by replacing
some member of the original sequence by the new number is also in the
cut. Although this is not provable in Q, it is provable in I∆0 + ω1, so it
will be true on the cut given by κ(x), so we are done.
The converse is similar. 
5.2. Peano Arithmetic Is a Special Case (I). The results proven in
the preceding section depend heavily upon the assumption that T is
finitely axiomatized. This is because, as mentioned previously, is that,
if T is infinitely axiomatized, then there is no reason, in general, to
suppose that T T will prove that all of T ’s axioms are true, though it
will prove that each of them is. But we do have the following obvious
corollary.
Corollary 5.8. Let T be an infinitely axiomatized theory. Then T T is
mutually locally interpretable with Q+
⋃{Con(U)}, where U is a finite
fragment of T .
Each finite fragment Q+ Con(U1) + · · ·+ Con(Un) of Q+
⋃{Con(U)}
is interpretable in U1T + · · ·+ UnT ⊆ T T . Each finite fragment UT of T T
is interpretable in Q+ Con(U) ⊆ Q+⋃{Con(U)}.
Corollary 5.9. If T is reflexive, then T T is interpretable in T .
Proof. A reflexive theory, by definition, is one that proves the consistency
of each of its finite sub-theories. So, if T is reflexive, it contains Q +⋃{Con(U)} and so itself locally interprets T T , and it then follows from
Orey’s Theorem that T globally interprets T T . 
So, in particular, we have:37
36Being primitive recursive, τκ(x) is of course repesentable in Q. As above, it will
actually be represented by a formula, but this will make no difference to what follows.
37Stronger versions of this result have been proven by Visser and Enayat. This
version seems to be folklore.
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Corollary 5.10. PAT is intepretable in PA.
5.3. Extending Induction. As I have emphasized, what was shown in
Section 5.1 is not that T T proves that T is consistent. If T is a finitely
axiomatized (sequential) theory, then T T will prove that T ’s axioms
are true and will prove that the rules preserve truth, but T T does not
have the induction axiom needed to conclude that all proofs have true
conclusions.38 The natural question to ask, then, is: What exactly do
we need to get a proof of T ’s consistency? We need T to contain some
induction axioms in the first place, and then we need to replace T T
with a version that extends the induction axioms to permit semantic
predicates—in particular, the truth-predicate—to occur therein.
It is not at all obvious, in general, what it means to ‘extend the in-
duction scheme’. The scheme might itself be stated in such a way as
to exclude formluae containing semantic vocabulary. To take a trivial
example, the scheme might require that its instances contain no predi-
cates other than identity. In the cases in which we shall be interested,
however, the right way to proceed is both clear and well established.
Intuitively, the point is that we may simply regard such formulae as
Satσ(t) as being among the atomic formulae from which the construction
of more complex formulae begins. More precisely, we may make use of
the so-called relativized arithmetical hierarchy (Hájek and Pudlák, 1993,
pp. 81ff). Let X be any set of formulas. A formula is said to be ∆0(X) if
it belongs to the smallest class of formulae that (i) contains all atomic
(arithmetical) formulae and all formulae in X and (ii) is closed under
Boolean operations and bounded quantification. A formula is then Σ1(X)
if it is of the form ∀yφ(y), where φ(y) is ∆0(X). And so forth. In our case,
if we take Sem to be the set of atomic semantic formulae—Denσ(t, x),
Satσ(x), and so forth—then what it means to ‘extend induction’ in the
case of I∆0, say, is that we permit induction on ∆0(Sem) formulae. The
resulting theory is thus I∆0(Sem). Similarly for IΣ1, etc.
Definition. Suppose that T is among I∆0, IΣn, I∆0(X), and so forth.
Then:
38Indeed, T T cannot even prove that all logically provable sentences—that is, sen-
tences provable using none of the special axioms of T—are true. Suppose T proves the
following:
Let the Ti be the axioms of T . Then if A is a theorem of T , ∧i Ti → A
is logically provable.
I do not know exactly how much is needed for the proof of the result. Not very much, to be
sure, but it surely cannot be proven in Q. In any event, reason in T T . Suppose that A is
provable in T . Then ∧i Ti → A is logically provable. By the Tarski clauses, T(∧i Ti → A)
iff T(T1) ∧ · · · ∧ T(Tn)→ T(A). Since each axiom is true, T(A) if T(∧i Ti → A). So, if all
logically provable sentences are true, every T -provable sentence is true.
Cies´lin´ski (2009) notes that the same result holds even in the case of PA, though of
course the argument is more complicated, since PA is not finitely axiomatizable.
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(1) T D+ is the result of (i) adding all T-sentences for the language
of T and (ii) extending the induction scheme in the sense just
explained.
(2) T S+ is the result of (i) adding not just the T-sentences for the
language of T but also the ‘Sat-sentences’, such as
Satσ(v0 = v1)] ≡ ∃x∃y[val(σ, 0, x) ∧ val(σ, 1, y) ∧ x = y],
and (ii) extending the induction scheme.
(3) T T+ is the result of (i) adding a fully compositional truth-theory
and (ii) extending the induction scheme.
We’ll begin by exploring T D+.
It’s well-known that PAD+ is a conservative extension of PA. Here’s a
similar result, but stated in terms of interpretability.
Theorem 5.11. PAD+ is interpretable in PA.
Proof. Let S be a finite subset of the axioms of PAD+. S will contain at
most finitely many T-sentences, say for A1, . . . , An. We interpret T(x) in
terms of a ‘list-like’ theory of truth, that is, as:
(x = pA1q ∧A1) ∨ · · · ∨ (x = pAnq ∧An)
Clearly, with T(x) so defined, PA will prove the T-sentences for A1, . . . , An.
Moreover, with T(x) so defined, any extended induction axioms that
appear in S will simply become induction axioms of PA.
So PAD+ is locally interpretable in PA. Now apply Orey’s Theorem. 
Note that this continues to hold for PAS+, by pretty much the same
reasoning. The same argument shows that QD+ and QS+ are locally
interpretable in Q.
The proof of 5.11 does not obviously extend, however, to sub-systems
of PA such as IΣ1: We cannot show so simply that IΣD+1 is locally in-
terpretable in IΣ1. The reason is that the Ai may be of any complexity,
and so, if we have an induction axiom for some Σ1(Sem) formula A(x),
the result of replacing T(x) by its ‘list-like’ definition in A(x) may yield
a formula that is not itself Σ1. But there is a slightly more complicated
proof that does work.
Theorem 5.12. IΣD+n is locally interpretable in IΣn.
Proof. Let S be a finite subset of the axioms of IΣD+n . Then S contains
only finitely many T-sentences. For illustration, say these are A and B.
As before, we interpret T(x) as: (x = pAq ∧ A) ∨ (x = pBq ∧B). We can
then easily prove the T-sentences for A and B. But, of course, S may also
contain some extended induction axioms from IΣD+n . We need to see that
these are also going to be provable.
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Suppose one of these induction axioms is the axiom for the formula
φ(x) ∨ T(sb(pψ(x))q, x)), where φ(x) is itself Σn but ψ(x) need not be.39
The induction axiom in question is thus:
φ(0) ∨ T(sb(pψ(x)q, 0))∧
∀x[φ(x) ∨ T(sb(pψ(x)q, x))→ φ(Sx) ∨ T(sb(pψ(x)q, Sx))]→
∀x(φ(x) ∨ T(sb(pψ(x)q, x)))
Under our interpretation of T(x), this becomes:[
φ(0) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, 0) = pAq ∧A) ∨ φ(0) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, 0) = pBq ∧B)]∧
∀x[φ(x) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, x) = pAq ∧A) ∨ φ(x) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, x) = pBq ∧B)→
φ(Sx) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, Sx) = pAq ∧A) ∨ φ(Sx) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, Sx) = pBq ∧B)]→
∀x[φ(x) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, x) = pAq ∧A) ∨ φ(x) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, x) = pBq ∧B)]
(Sorry about that.) The crucial point is that A and B are sentences, so
the quantifier ∀x cannot bind any variables in A or B . Hence, they can
be “pulled out” in the following way.
Abbreviate the formula just displayed as Φ(A,B). Then it is logically
equivalent to:
[A ∧B → Φ(>,>)] ∧ [A ∧ ¬B → Φ(>,⊥)]∧
[¬A ∧B → Φ(⊥,>)] ∧ [¬A ∧ ¬B → Φ(⊥,⊥)]
where > is 0 = 0 and ⊥ is 0 6= 0. By completeness, this equivalence is
provable. Now Φ(>,>) is:
φ(0) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, 0) = pAq ∧ >) ∨ φ(0) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, 0) = pBq ∧ >)∧
∀x[φ(x) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, x) = pAq ∧ >) ∨ φ(x) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, x) = pBq ∧ >)→
φ(Sx) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, Sx) = pAq ∧ >) ∨ φ(Sx) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, Sx) = pBq ∧ >)]→
∀x[φ(x) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, x) = pAq ∧ >) ∨ φ(x) ∨ (sb(pψ(x)q, x) = pBq ∧ >)]
and that is itself a Σn induction axiom. It is therefore provable, and
hence so is A ∧B → Φ(>,>). The same goes for the other cases. So the
induction axiom in question is provable under our interpretation of T(x).
Of course, nothing hinges on the details of this particular example. 
As we shall see, corresponding results do not hold for IΣS+n .
39Here, sb(y, x) means: The result of substituting the numeral for x for the sole
free variable in y. I choose this example because the threat here is that the ability to
substitute in this way will allow us to get the induction axiom for φ(x) ∨ ψ(x), which
need not be Σn.
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5.4. Semantic Consistency Proofs. If T T+ is going to formalize Tarski’s
proof of Con(T ), then it will need to be able to do two things: (i) Carry
out the induction at the core of that proof, and (ii) Prove that all of the
logical and non-logical axioms of T are true.
The obvious sort of formula to use in the inductive part of the proof is
something like:
ι(n)
df≡ ∀z∀y∀m < n[(BewT (z, y) ∧ lh(z,m)→ ∀σSatσ(y)]
This is Π1(Sem). Moreover, as a look back at (1)–(5) will show, the
formulae involved in the various inductions needed to prove that logic
is true are Π1(Sem)—except for the one concerning denotation, which is
Σ1(Sem). Since IΣ1 has induction for Π1 formulae (Hájek and Pudlák,
1993, p. 63, theorem 2.4), we thus have:40
Theorem 5.13. Suppose T ⊇ IΣ1 and suppose further that T T+ proves
that all axioms of S (which may or may not be T ) are true. Then T T+
proves Con(S).
Corollary 5.14. Suppose T ⊇ IΣ1 is finitely axiomatized. Then T T+
proves Con(T ).
This might seem like a nice, neat result. Since IΣn is finitely axiomati-
zable, we’ll get that (IΣ1)T+ proves the consistency of IΣ1, that (IΣ2)T+
proves Con(IΣ2), and so forth.
Unfortunately, things do not work out nearly so nicely.
5.5. How PAT+ Proves Con(PA). Everyone knows that PAT+ proves
Con(PA). But it’s a good deal less obvious how it does so than people
often seem to suppose. What you usually hear people say—and what I
myself usually say—is that the proof goes like this: First, you prove that
the axioms are true; then you prove that the rules of inference preserve
truth; and then you use the extended induction scheme to conclude that
all the theorems are true. Since ‘0 = S0’ is provably untrue, it isn’t a
theorem, so PA is consistent.
But this sketch fails to address a very important question, namely:
How are we supposed to prove that all of the axioms of PA are true?41
We can easily enough prove, of each axiom, that it is true, since we can
prove its T-sentence and we can prove it. But that is an entirely different
40Henrik Kotlarski (1986) seems to claim that this result can be strengthened to
T ⊇ I∆0. This seems doubtful, however. Kotlarski is simply not careful enough about
the case of the logical axioms. Enayat and Visser have show that Kotlarski’s result can
be salvaged in the semantic setting in which he works by strengthening the conditions
on satisfaction classes. In the present axiomatic setting, one could, similarly, add an
axiom to the truth-theory stipulating that ‘variable switching’ works as it should. But
that does not seem very interesting.
41Wang (1952, p. 260) credits J. Barkley Rosser with the observation that this question
needs to be addressed.
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matter. There are truckloads of very important cases where PA can prove
that each number blurgs without being able to prove that every number
blurgs. So again: How do we prove that all of PA’s axioms are true?
The answer is that the truth of all the axioms falls out of a single





0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, z) ∧ Satτ (a)
]
Here, a is meant to code a formula with v0 free, e.g., A(v0, ~y), where ~y indi-
cates additional free variables that might occur. So what φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, σ, z)
says is that A(v0, ~y) is satisfied by the sequence that is just like σ except
that it assigns z to v0. Note that A(v0, ~y) is doing duty as a variable with
which we are reasoning in PA.
We have the induction axiom:
φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, 0, σ)∧
∀v0[φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, v0, σ)→ φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, Sv0, σ)]→
∀v0[φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, v0, σ)]
What we want to show is that
A(0, ~y) ∧ ∀v0 [A(v0, ~y)→ A(Sv0, ~y)]→ ∀v0(A(v0, ~y))
is true. This will be true just in case the displayed formula is satisfied
by every sequence σ. But then, by the clauses for the connectives, that
holds just in case, for every sequence σ:
Satσ(pA(0, ~y)q)∧
Satσ(p∀v0[A(v0, ~y)→ A(Sv0, ~y)]q)→
Satσ(p∀v0A(v0, ~y)q)
This is what we want to prove. What we need to show is:
(1) Satσ(pA(0, ~y)q) implies φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, 0, σ)
(2) Satσ(p∀v0[A(v0, ~y)→ A(Sv0, ~y)]q) implies
∀v0[φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, v0, σ)→ φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, Sv0, σ)]
(3) ∀v0[φ(pA(v0, ~y)q, v0, σ)] implies Satσ(p∀v0A(v0, ~y)q)
None of these are terribly difficult, given three important facts:
(i) If σ and τ agree on the free variables present in some formula ψ,
then Satσ(ψ) iff Satτ (ψ).
(ii) If Satσ(pψ(0)q) and val(σ, 0, 0), then Satσ(pψ(v0)q).
(iii) If Satσ(pψ(Sv0)q), and if τ is just like σ except that what it assigns
to v0 is the successor of what σ assigns to v0, then Satτ (pψ(v0)q).42
All of these are provable in PAT+ by the usual sorts of arguments.
We get (1) immediately from (ii).
42We’re assuming, of course, that all free occurences of v0 have been replaced by
occurrences of Sv0.
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For (2), Satσ(p∀v0[A(v0, ~y)→ A(Sv0, ~y)]q) is equivalent to:
(5.1) ∀χ 0∼ σ [Satχ(pA(v0, ~y)q)→ Satχ(pA(Sv0, ~y)q)]
What we want to show is:
∀v0{∃τ [τ 0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, v0) ∧ Satτ (pA(v0, ~y)q)]→
∃τ [τ 0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, Sv0) ∧ Satτ (pA(v0, ~y)q)]}
So suppose ∃τ [τ 0∼ σ∧val(τ, 0, v0)∧Satτ (pA(v0, ~y)q)]. Then Satτ (pA(Sv0, ~y)q),
by (5.1). Now let υ be just like τ except that it assigns v0 the successor of
what τ assigns v0. Then, by (iii), Satυ(pA(v0, ~y)q). And so, generalizing,
we have
∃τ [τ 0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, Sv0) ∧ Satτ (pA(v0, ~y)q)]},
as wanted.
The argument for (3) is similar.
What makes all of this go, then, is the fact that PA is schematically
axiomatized: An extended instance of the induction scheme for PA can be
made to yield all the unextended instances. But, by the same token, the
argument works only because PA is schematically axiomatized. If T is an
infinitely axiomatized theory that is not schematically axiomatized, such
as primitive recursive arithmetic, then there is no reason whatsoever to
expect that T T+ should prove that all of T ’s axioms are true.
So, as Visser once put it, the fact that PAT+ proves Con(PA) is some-
thing of a happy accident. Too happy, as we are about to see.
5.6. An Unfortunate Result.
Lemma 5.15. (IΣ1)T+ proves that all axioms of PA are true.
Proof. The argument given in the last section needed precisely one ex-
tended instance of induction, that for the formula φ(a, σ, z). This is Σ1.43
The other thing we need to check is that the general principles (i)–(iii) on
which we relied can be proven in (IΣ1)T+. The proofs of these are all by
induction, but, other than the semantic notions, there is nothing in these
that isn’t primtive recursive and so ∆1 in IΣ1; the universal quantifier
over sequences makes the relevant claims Π1. So the reasoning in the
last section can all be carried out in (IΣ1)T+. 
Corollary 5.16. (IΣ1)T+ proves Con(PA).44
Proof. By Theorem 5.13. 
43As mentioned in note 11, τ 0∼ σ can be made to be ∆1.
44Kotlarski (1986) claims that (I∆0)T+ proves Con(PA). It can be shown that
(I∆0)
T+ proves that all axioms of PA are true, but, as mentioned in note 40, Kotlarski
does not address the question how we are supposed to show that ‘logic is true’, and it
does not appear that (I∆0)T+ can prove that logic is true.
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Since Con(PA) is a single theorem of PAT+, the full power of PAT+
can’t be needed for the proof; only finitely many axioms of PAT+ will be
needed, so Con(PA) has to be provable in (IΣn)T+, for some n. In that
sense, Corollary 5.16 is no surprise. Nonetheless, I take it to be a bad
result in the context of the present investigation, in so far as it suggests
that we do not yet have things properly formulated. It’s a perfectly
natural question what sort of truth-theory you need to formalize the
obvious sort of semantic consistency proof for IΣ1. It’s disappointing if
the answer turns out to be, “One that proves Con(PA)”.45
It’s worth noting that we get a similar phenomenon in (I∆0)S+.
Theorem 5.17. (I∆0)S+ contains PA.
The argument is similar in spirit to the one for Lemma 5.15. The
difference is that, in this case, we are proving only that (I∆0)S+ proves
each of the induction axioms for PA, rather than that it proves that they
are all true. This makes things rather easier.
Proof. Let A(v0, v1) be a formula; extension to the case of extra free
variables is straightforward. Now consider the formula:
φ(z)
df≡ ∃τ < t(σ, z)
[
τ
0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, z) ∧ Satτ (pA(v0, v1)q)
]
Here, t(σ, z) is a term I shall not attempt to describe that appropri-
ately bounds the initial quantifier.46 So this is ∆0(Sem), so (I∆0)S+ has
induction for it. The induction axiom is:
∃τ < t(σ, 0)
[
τ
0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, 0) ∧ Satτ (pA(v0, v1)q)
]
∧
∀v0{∃τ < t(σ, v0)[τ 0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, v0) ∧ Satτ (pA(v0, v1)q)]→
∃τ < t(σ, Sv0)[τ 0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, Sv0) ∧ Satτ (pA(Sv0, v1)q)]} →
∀v0∃τ < t(σ, v0)
[
τ
0∼ σ ∧ val(τ, 0, v0) ∧ Satτ (pA(v0, v1)q)
]
But the Sat-sentence for A(x, y) will give us:
Satτ (pA(v0, v1)q) ≡ ∃v0∃v1[val(τ, 0, v0) ∧ val(τ, 1, v1) ∧A(v0, v1)]
So φ(z) is equivalent to:
∃v1[val(τ, 1, v1) ∧A(z, v1)]
45Of course, PA itself proves Con(IΣ1), and the argument is semantic in character—it
uses a partial truth-theory for the language of arithmetic—but it is very much not the
sort of argument we are discussing.
46Since τ can be taken to be σ with the first entry changed to z, we can actually
calculate what τ is, given σ.
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Then the induction axiom reduces to:
∃v1[val(σ, 1, v1) ∧A(0, v1)]∧
∀v0 [∃v1[val(σ, 1, v1) ∧A(v0, v1)]→ ∃v1[val(σ, 1, v1) ∧A(Sv0, v1)]]→
∀v0∃v1[val(σ, 1, v1) ∧A(v0, v1)]
and this holds for any σ.
Now suppose A(0, v1) and ∀v0(A(v0, v1)→ A(Sv0, v1)). Then there is a
sequence χ such that val(χ, 1, v1). Hence, for this χ, we have: A(v0, v1) ≡
∃v1(val(χ, 1, v1) ∧A(v0, v1)). So the induction axiom becomes:
A(0, v1) ∧ ∀v0(A(v0, v1)→ A(Sv0, v1))→ ∀v0(A(v0))
as wanted. 
This last result is relevant to Volker Halbach’s (2001a) claim that the
‘uniform disquotation scheme’—our (·)S+—is plausibly analytic, since
PAS+ is a conservative extension of PA. What we have just seen, however,
is that this result depends crucially upon the choice of PA as base theory.
Whether one takes conservativity to be required for analyticity or regards
it as merely indicative of it, the uniform disquotation scheme appears
to be logically quite strong, transforming a theory interpretable in Q
into one that contains PA. It is only in very special cases that it gives us
nothing we did not already have.
6. DISENTANGLING SYNTAX FROM THE OBJECT-LANGUAGE
6.1. Reviving an Old Approach to Truth-theories. What’s respon-
sible for the unfortunate Corollary 5.16?
Semantic consistency proofs make use of two different sorts of theories,
for two very different sorts of reasons. On the one hand, we have a ‘base
theory’ that gives us the syntactic machinery we need to formulate our
truth-theory and then to reason within it. Among other things, for
example, the extended induction axioms allow us to formalize arguments
by induction on the complexity of expressions, or the length of proofs, or
what have you. On the other hand, there is the object-theory, which is
the theory we mean to be reasoning about, the theory whose consistency
we mean to be proving. We need to know that all the axioms of the object-
theory are true, and the idea is to get their truth from them: We assume
the axioms themselves and derive their truth from their T-sentences.
As we have seen, however, that is not at all how things work in the
case of PA. The truth of all the axioms of PA is not derived from the
axioms of PA in that way, and, on reflection, it’s easy to see that it can’t
be: The truth of each axiom of PA can be derived from that axiom, but
that’s it. This is what leads to Corollary 5.16: The truth of all the axioms
of PA is a consequence, not of those axioms, but of a single instance of
induction. Speaking more generally, the problem is that a single theory is
playing both of the roles I just distinguished: In (IΣ1)T+, IΣ1 is both the
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underlying syntax and what provides us with the axioms of the theory
we had meant to be reasoning about. So induction axioms that were
introduced to allow us to formalize certain sorts of syntactic arguments
have instances that entail the truth of principles in the object-language
that go beyond what we’d meant to be assuming.
The solution to the problem is therefore obvious: We need to disen-
tangle the syntax from the object-language. And, interestingly enough,
this is how Tarski himself proceeds in “The Concept of Truth in Formal-
ized Languages”. I quoted Tarski’s description of the meta-theory in
which he proposes to define truth earlier. Here is his description of the
meta-language:
A meta-language which meets our requirements must con-
tain three groups of expressions: (1) expressions of a gen-
eral logical kind; (2) expressions having the same meaning
as all the constants of the language to be discussed. . . ;
(3) expressions of the structural-descriptive type which
denote single signs and expressions of the language con-
sidered, whole classes and sequences of such expressions
or, finally, the relations existing between them. (Tarski,
1958, pp. 210–11)
The expressions mentioned under (3) belong, of course, to syntax. Tarski
does not actually say that these expressions will be disjoint from those
mentioned under (2), but it is natural to read him that way. That
is plainly how he conceives the matter in his discussion, in section
3, of the calculus of classes (Tarski, 1958, pp. 172ff). Tarski was of
course aware—at least by the time his paper was published—that the
syntactic theory can be interpreted in arithmetic: His famous theorem
on the indefinability of truth depends upon that fact. But the positive
part of Tarski’s project—showing how it is possible to define truth in a
consistent manner, suitable for the purposes of meta-mathematics—in
no way depends upon this now familiar maneuver. So the basic idea of
separating the syntax from the object-theory is old, even if the application
I propose to make of it is somewhat new.
So let L be the (finite) language for which we want to give a truth-
theory. We let S be a disjoint (and fixed) language in which we will
formalize our syntax. The most natural choice for S, and the one that
would be closest to Tarksi’s original intentions, would be a theory of
concatenation (Quine, 1946; Tarski et al., 1953; Grzegorczyk, 2005); this
would also have the advantage that what follows would be independent of
issues about how we code expressions. To keep things familiar, however,
we shall take S to be isomorphic to the language of arithmetic.47 (Think
of S as the language of arithmetic written in boldface, or something
47The fact that L is disjoint from S is no obstacle to our coding facts about L in S.
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of the sort.) Our theory of syntax can then be taken be Q, or I∆0, or
whatever we wish.
If we’re going to do the semantics of L, then we’re going to need to be
able to talk about the things L talks about. In particular, if we’re going
to have the usual Tarski-style clauses for the primitive expressions of
the object-language, then we are going to need to have the expressive
resources of L available to us, as Tarski notes at (2). So the obvious
choice for the language of our semantic theory would be S ∪ L. There
are, however, complications. Suppose that L is the language of set theory.
Then the quantifiers in sentences of L would normally be understood as
ranging over all and only the sets. But the quantifiers in sentences of S
do not range over all sets, even if (perhaps) they range over some of them.
So we need to keep the domains of S and L separate somehow. There
are various ways to do this. Perhaps the simplest is to let the semantic
theory be many-sorted. So that’s what we’ll do. Variables ranging over
the domain of S will be italic; those ranging over the domain of L will be
upright.48
If we do go this way, then we’re also going to need a separate theory of
sequences or, better, of assignments of objects to variables: There will
be no hope at all of coding sequences of objects from the domain of L as
objects in S, at least not in general. So we shall takes ourselves to have
the following theory of assignments available:
∀v[var(v)→ ∀α∀x∃β(val(β, ν) = x ∧ β v∼ α)]
As before, β v∼ α abbreviates: ∀w [var(w) ∧ v 6= w → val(β,w) = val(α,w))].
What this says is thus that, given any assignment, the value it assigns
to a given variable can always be changed as one pleases. Assignments
live in yet a third sort. Variables ranging over them will be Greek letters.
That there is at least one assignment, and that every assignment assigns
a unique object to each variable, are truths of logic, in this formulation.
Given this theory of assignments, we can then state a truth-theory for
L. The theory will be more or less the familiar one, though with some
adjustments to take account of the present framework. For example,
these axioms will be common to all theories, independent of L:
v: var(v)→ Denα(v, x) ≡ x = val(α, v)
∧: Satα(pA ∧Bq) ≡ Satα(A) ∧ Satα(B)
∀: Satα(p∀viA(vi)q) ≡ ∀β[β i∼ α→ Satβ(pA(x)q)
The other axioms of the theory will depend upon L. If L is the language
of set theory, then the only other axiom will be:
∈: Satα(pt ∈ uq) ≡ ∃x∃y[Denα(t, x) ∧Denα(u, y) ∧ x ∈ y]
In the case of the language of arithmetic, we’ll have axioms like:
48The two-sorted theory can of course be interpreted in a single sorted theory via the
usual relativization to a pair of domains. This is more or less what Craig and Vaught
(1958) do.
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0: Denα(‘0’, x) ≡ x = 0
+: Denα(pt+ uq, x) ≡ ∃y∃z[Denσ(t, y) ∧Denσ(u, z) ∧ x = y + z]
Note that, in both these cases, the used expressions ‘0’ and ‘+’ are expres-
sions of L, not of S.
So that is the theory in which I propose henceforth to work. As for
notation:
Definition. Let T be an arithmetical theory. Then T̂ TL is the semantics
for L we have just described.
We can think of ξ̂ Tη as a two-place functor: Given a theory and a
language, it returns a new theory that constitutes a semantics for that
language based upon the original theory as syntax. Our interest is in
the properties of this functor.
Note that we are not (yet) extending any induction scheme that might
be present in T . So T̂ TL is not going to be formalizing semantic con-
sistency proofs of the sort discussed in Section 5.4. More generally,
induction in T̂ TL does not apply to statements involving assignments, or
semantics, or the object-language. The induction axioms must be ‘purely
syntactical’.
6.2. The Weakness of Compositional Truth-theories. We now prove
a strong generalization of Corollary 3.5, which told us that we can formal-
ize a materially adequate theory of truth for the language of arithmetic
in the weak theory we called QseqT . It turns out that we can do this for
any finite language, and we can do it in a theory interpretable in Q.49
Lemma 6.1. Q̂ TL is a materially adequate theory of truth for L. That is,
Q̂ TL proves
T(pAq) ≡ A
for each sentence A of L.
Proof. Essentially the same as that of Lemma 3.1. 
The first lesson we learn here, then, is that a materially adequate
theory of truth for L need make use of no information whatsoever about
whatever it is that L talks about. As said, any theory of truth that is going
to be materially adequate, in the sense that it proves all ‘disquotational’
T-sentences, is of course going to have to have the expressive resources
of the object-language available to it. But that is all. We haven’t even
mentioned any theory formulated in L to this point, let alone made use
of one.
This result plays an important role in Craig and Vaught’s (1958) proof
that every axiomatizable theory that has no finite models has a finitely
49I think we can do something similar even for non-finite languages. In this case, it’ll
be local interpretability that’s of interest, rather than interpretability. But I’m not sure
about this.
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axiomatizable conservative extension. Their argument is an extension of
one due to Kleene (1952).
Consider some recursively axiomatizable theory T . We take a weak,
finitely axiomatizable theory of syntax—Q, more or less—a weak theory
of assignments, and the Tarski clauses for the language of T . That’s
enough to prove the T-sentence for each sentence of the language of T
(Craig and Vaught, 1958, p. 296, Lemma 2.4). So now, since the set of
T ’s axioms is recursive, it is representable in Q, and we need only add
one more axiom: All of T ’s axioms are true. This theory clearly contains
T , and the fact that it is a conservative extension of T can be proven by
the usual sort of model-theoretic argument (Craig and Vaught, 1958, p.
298, Lemma 2.7).
Thus, Q̂ TL is not a mere curiosity but is of actual mathematical utility.
It is also as weak as it is possible for it to be.
Lemma 6.2. Q̂ TL is interpretable in Q.
Proof. The basic idea here is very simple: Since no theory stated in L is
so far in evidence, we can give L the completely trivial interpretation
whose domain is {0}, that takes each term to denote 0, and that takes
every predicate to have an empty extension. The theory of assignments
is then completely trivial: val(v, x) will always be true, for each v and
x. A semantic theory for the language, so interpreted, is then easily
constructed. 
Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 give us a first indication of why it is worth disen-
tangling syntax from the object-theory. Together, they imply that there is
a materially adequate truth-theory for the language of arithmetic that is
as weak as it could plausibly be: It is interpretable in Q. If, on the other
hand, we develop our truth-theory in the usual way, where syntax and
the object-theory are intertwined, then the weakest materially adequate
truth-theory is QseqT . And it follows from Theorem 5.3 that QseqT is not
interpretable in Q. So Lemma 6.1 is an improvement on Theorem 5.3.50
6.3. The Strength of Compositional Truth-theories, and the Weak-
ness of Disquotational Ones. We know, then, from Lemma 6.2, that
Q̂ TL is very weak. Unfortunately, however, this does not really help us to
characterize the strength of truth-theories. For one thing, the interpreta-
tion of Q̂ TL in Q wreaks havoc on the meanings of the primitives of L: It
50These results have another sort of significance. If, as I am inclined to believe
(Heck, 2005, 2007), a speaker’s semantic competence consists in her tacitly knowing a
truth-theory for her language, one might worry, for reasons similar to those mentioned
in connection with the problem of ‘essential richness’, that this would credit ordinary
speakers with far too much tacit knowledge. But knowing such a theory need involve no
more than knowing Q̂ TL , and the logical strength of that theory derives entirely from
its syntactic component.
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all but treats L as uninterpreted. How, then, might we force the truth-
theory to respect the meanings of L’s primitives? One plausible answer is
to require the interpretation to preserve some theory stated in L. Indeed,
we might naturally interpret Tarski as taking the object-theory to play
something like this role. (Though we do not need to suppose, as Tarski
may have, that L must in any sense consist of ‘meaning postulates’.)51
Moreover, the question how strong truth-theories are is best understood
as the question: What does ‘adding a truth-theory’ give us, in terms
of logical strength? That is, if we have some theory T and we ‘add a
truth-theory’ to it, how strong is the resulting theory, compared to T
itself? In our terminology, the question is thus how Q̂ TL + T compares,
in logical strength, to T . From this point of view, Lemma 6.2 concerns
the special case where T is the null theory.
As was explained in Section 2.1, there are different ways of comparing
theories, so we can ask various sorts of questions about the relationship
between Q̂ TL + T and T . One question is whether Q̂ TL + T is a conser-
vative extension of T . And we have, in fact, already seen that it is: That
is the result of Craig and Vaught’s (1958) mentioned earlier, in a slightly
different form.
But there is a different, and ultimately more interesting, question we
can also ask, namely, whether Q̂ TL + T is interpretable in T . And to this
question, the answer is “no”, at least if T is finitely axiomatized.
Theorem 6.3. Let T be a consistent theory in L. Then Q̂ TL plus ‘all
axioms of T are true’ proves the consistency of T on a cut.
Corollary 6.4. Let T be a finitely axiomatized, consistent theory in L.
Then Q̂ TL + T proves the consistency of T on a cut and so is not inter-
pretable in T .52
The proof of Theorem 6.3 is essentially the same as that of Theorem 5.3.
Corollary 6.4 then follows from Corollary 4.7 and the obvious analogue
of Corollary 3.3.
It’s worth emphasizing that the only role T plays in the proof is in
allowing us to prove that all T ’s axioms are true. The work is all done in
Q̂ TL .
We also get an analogue of Corollary 5.6.
Theorem 6.5. Let T be a finitely axiomatized, consistent theory in L.
Then Q̂ TL + T is mutually interpretable with Q+ Con(T ).
Proof. That Q̂ TL + T interprets Q + Con(T ) follows from Theorem 6.3.
The other direction is just a minor modification of Theorem 5.5. 
51These remarks are largely based upon observations due to John P. Burgess.
52Note that it follows that the finitely axiomatizable theory Craig and Vaught show
is a conservative extension of T is not interpretable in T .
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We thus see again that compositional truth-theories have at least
some logical power: If we start with a finitely axiomatized theory T and
add an absolutely minimal but still compositional theory of truth for the
language of T—and add it in a way that is guaranteed not to ‘infect’ T
itself—the result is a theory that is logically stronger than T in the sense
that it is not interpretable in T .53
Even from a purely technical point of view, then, Q̂ TL is an interesting
theory. It is as weak as it can be, yet Q̂ TL ‘upGödels’ any finitely axioma-
tized theory T that you care to give it.54 We can think of Pudlák’s form
of the incompleteness theorem as defining a map on theories: Given a
consistent, sequential theory T containing Q, it hands us Q + Con(T ),
which is guaranteed to be logically stronger than T in the sense that it is
not interpretable in T . In effect, what we have found is that, for finitely
axiomatized theories, Q̂ TL can be used to define the same functor, mod-
ulo interpretabilty: Given a finitely axiomatized theory T in L, Q̂ TL + T
is mutually interpretable with Q+ Con(T ).55
By contrast, the T-sentences themselves have no logical power, even
if we extend whatever induction scheme might happen to be available.
Once again, getting a completely general version of this result is hard,
because schemes can come in so many different forms. But if, as before,
we focus just on the case of the usual hierarchy, then the claim can be
stated precisely. And again, the results here significantly improve the
corresponding results of Section 5.3, which is yet another reason to want
to disentangle syntax from the object-theory.
Definition. T̂ D+A is the theory of truth for the language of arithmetic
that is similar to T̂ TA but, instead of containing a compositional theory
of truth contains the T-sentences for A and extends the induction scheme
to permit the presence of the truth-predicate.
By essentially the same argument as for Theorem 5.12, we have:
Proposition 6.6. ÎΣn D+A is locally interpretable in IΣn.
It is clear that we thus also have:
53It would, I think, be well worth investigating such theories as ÎΣ1 TL . It’s of course
immediate that ÎΣ1 TL + T is not interpretable in T , since even Q̂ TL + T isn’t. But is
there some nice characterization of exactly how strong ÎΣ1 TL + T is? In general, one
would suppose it is stronger than Q̂ TL + T ; surely it isn’t interpretable in Q+ Con(T ).
On the other hand, one would suppose that ÎΣ1 TL + T is weaker than ÎΣ1 T+L + T (for
which, see below) and, in particular, that it does not interpret IΣ1 + Con(T ). So where
precisely does it sit? And what of intermediate theories, like Î∆0 TL + T ?
54Thanks to Visser for the wonderful neologism.
55Note that if we use a theory of concatenation as our base theory, then this result is
coding-free and so gives us a co-ordinate-free account of what consistency statements are,
like the central result of Visser’s paper on the second incompleteness theorem (Visser,
2009a, theorem 4.1).
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Proposition 6.7. ÎΣn D+A + T is locally interpretable in IΣn + T .
And so, in particular:
Corollary 6.8. ÎΣn D+A + IΣm is locally interpretable in IΣk, where
k = max(m,n).
Proof. ÎΣn D+A + IΣm is locally interpretable in IΣn + IΣm, where these
two theories are formulated in disjoint copies of the language of arith-
metic. But IΣn + IΣm will obviously be interpretable in IΣmax(m,n). 
So we get an analogue of Theorem 5.11.
Corollary 6.9. P̂AD+A + PA is interpretable in PA.
Proof. Any finite fragment of this theory is contained in one or another
of the ÎΣn D+A + IΣm. So each finite fragment is interpretable in IΣn,
for some n, and so in PA. That establishes local interpretability, and now
we invoke Orey’s Theorem. 
We’ll see shortly that something even stronger is true.56
6.4. Semantic Consistency Proofs, Again. We have seen that Q̂ TL +
T is not interpretable in T , because it proves the consistency of T on a cut.
It does so because it proves the basis case and the induction step of the
usual semantic proof of the consistency of T . That leaves us more or less
where we were at the end of Section 5.1. The next question to ask, then,
is what we need to add if we are to get a proof of the consistency of T .
As we saw in Section 5.4, the answer is going to be something along the
lines of ‘induction for Σ1 formulae’. In the framework in which we were
then working, this answer turned out to be correct but disappointing.
It’s true that (IΣ1)T+ proves the consistency of IΣ1, but it also proves
the consistency of PA.
The work we did in the last section puts us in a position to resolve
this problem. What we need to add is, indeed, something along the lines
of ‘induction for Σ1 formulae’. But the problem that infected our earlier
efforts has now been resolved: We can strengthen our theory of syntax
without thereby strengthening the object-theory whose consistency we
are trying to prove. Let me emphasize what this says about the role
induction plays in semantic consistency proofs: The induction we need
for the proof is a syntactic principle, not a number-theoretic one. It’s
a principle that has to do, at least in the application we need to make
of it, with inductions on proofs; it has nothing to do with whatever the
object-language happens to be about. This is obvious once stated, but
the usual way of formulating truth-theories obscures the point.
So now we need a definition paralleling that of T T+.
56What happens if we consider theories related to T̂ D+A as T S+ is related to T D+?
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Definition. T̂ T+L is T̂ TL with the induction axioms in T extended to
permit semantic vocabulary and reference to assignments.
As before, this definition isn’t perfectly general. But we know how
to apply it to the cases that matter here: ÎΣn T
+
L is really ̂IΣn(Sem) TL ,
where Sem is the set of atomic formulae of the forms: Denα(t, x); Satα(x);
T(x); and val(σ, x).
It’s important to appreciate that, in extending induction in this way,
we are not extending it nearly as far as we might extend it. The only new
induction axioms we are allowing are ones that contain the semantic
predicates mentioned. For example, suppose that L is the language of
set-theory, and consider the following formulae (which are chosen more
or less randomly):
∃xDenσ(t, x)
x ∈ y ∧ val(σ, v) = x ∧ Satσ(z)
We do not have induction for such formulae in ÎΣn T
+
L , as I am under-
standing it. The first is ruled out because it contains the quantifier ‘∃x’,
which ranges not over numbers but over sets. The second is ruled out
because it contains the predicate ∈.
I am not terribly happy about this restriction. By imposing it, we force
ourselves to operate with what might seem like an unnaturally weak
theory, and the significance of the results we shall prove about what it
can or, more importantly, cannot do might therefore be questioned. It’s
my hope that there will prove to be some natural way of loosening these
restrictions and allowing induction over the formulae mentioned, and
others of their general kind, without adding (significant?) strength to
ÎΣn
T+L . Part of the difficulty is that it is hard to know how to integrate
quantifiers over sets (or, more generally, whatever the object-language
talks about) into our measure of logical complexity: What sorts of for-
mulae count as Σn, in the relevant sense, if these formulae may contain
quantifiers over both numbers and sets? But let us leave such questions
aside for now.
It is clear that we can now adapt the arguments given in Section 5.4 to
our new framework. In particular, we will be able to formalize a semantic
proof of Con(T ) is ÎΣ1 T+L + T , where L of course is the language of T . So
we have:
Theorem 6.10. Let T be a theory in a finite relational language L, and
suppose that ÎΣ1 T
+
L + T proves that all axioms of T are true. Then
ÎΣ1
T+L + T ` Con(T ).
The restriction to relational languages is essential, because, we cannot
prove that every term has a denotation. The obvious way to do so would
be by induction on ∃xDenσ(t, x), but, for the reasons just mentioned, we
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do not have induction for this predicate in ÎΣ1 T
+
L . As earlier, however,
the restriction can then be lifted, since IΣ1 will prove that a theory
T stated in a non-relational language can always be interpreted in its
relational counterpart TR and so that, if Con(TR), then Con(T ). So we
have:
Corollary 6.11. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory in a finite lan-
guage L. Then ÎΣ1 T+L + T ` Con(T ).
There is thus a sense in which Corollary 5.16, though surprising
in a way, is in another way natural. The syntax needed to carry out
semantic consistency proofs is no more than can be formalized in IΣ1. If
Corollary 5.16 seems surprising, it is because one might have thought
we needed to assume the axioms of PA in order to able to prove that all
the axioms of PA are true. Well, we don’t. As Tarski himself put it, we
need not assume “axioms which have the same meaning as the axioms
of the science under investigation”, but only ones that “suffice. . . for
the establishment of all sentences having the same meaning as the
theorems of the science being investigated” (Tarski, 1958, p. 211). And it
turns out that assuming extended Σ1 induction is assuming axioms that
“suffice. . . for the establishment of all” axioms of PA.
What we want to see now, then, is that our way of disentangling syntax
from the object-language really does solve the problem Corollary 5.16
revealed. What we would like to be able to show is that, although ÎΣ1 T
+
L+
IΣ1 proves Con(IΣ1), it does not prove Con(PA) or even Con(IΣ2). To
show this, we will establish a sort of converse of Corollary 6.11.
Theorem 6.12. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory in a finite language.
Then ÎΣ1 T
+
L + T is interpretable in IΣ1 + Con(T ).
Before we begin the proof, let me note a couple important corollaries.
Corollary 6.13. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory in a finite lan-
guage. Then ÎΣ1 T
+
L + T is mutually interpretable with IΣ1 + Con(T ).
This follows immediately, since ÎΣ1 T
+
L + T contains IΣ1 + Con(T ). We
can generalize yet further.
Corollary 6.14. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory in a finite lan-
guage. Then, if n ≥ 1, ÎΣn T+L + T is mutually interpretable with IΣn +
Con(T ).
We’ll prove Corollary 6.14 after we prove Theorem 6.12.
We are going to need a version of the so-called arithmetized complete-
ness theorem (Hájek and Pudlák, 1993, pp. 104–5), which is provable
in IΣ1. There are two different ways one often sees this theorem stated,
and the proof of Theorem 6.12 rests upon the way these two statements
of it relate to one another.
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Theorem 6.15 (Arithmetized Completeness Theorem). Let T be a recur-
sively axiomatized theory. Then:
(1) IΣ1 + Con(T ) interprets T .
(2) IΣ1 + Con(T ) proves that T has a model, one whose complexity is
what Hajék and Pudlák call low Σ∗0(Σ1), or LL1.
By a ‘model’ here is meant precisely what one would think is meant:
A certain sort of set, arithmetically coded, of course.57 The model is
understood to come with a corresponding compositional truth-theory,
that is, with notions of denotation, satisfaction, and truth for which the
usual Tarskian clauses can be proved, and of course sequences will serve
to code the theory of assignments.58 That the model is a model of T
amounts to its being provable, in IΣ1 + Con(T ), that the axioms of T are,
in the sense of truth associated with the model, true, that is, that they
are true in the model.
I am not going to attempt to explain what ‘low Σ∗0(Σ1)’ means. It
doesn’t really matter for our purposes—and, frankly, I don’t really un-
derstand it very well.59 I will explain why the complexity of the model
matters—note that it is independent of T—and why its being LL1 is
enough for the proof of Theorem 6.12.
Proof of Theorem 6.12. If we are going to intepret ÎΣ1 T
+
L + T in IΣ1 +
Con(T ), we need to deal with three things: (i) T ; (ii) the semantic theory
for L, including the theory of assignments; and (iii) the underlying
syntax, IΣ1. A significant part of the last will be no problem, since we
already have IΣ1 available. But we will need to make sure that we can
prove the extended induction axioms. We’ll deal with that last.
The arithmetized completeness theorem tells us that IΣ1 + Con(T )
can give us (i) and (ii): It interprets T , and it gives us a a model for
T , with which we get a semantics for L. But these aren’t enough by
themselves: We need to make sure that they fit together the right way.
To see why, suppose T is Q. Then ‘0’ is a term, and among the axioms of
57It is not widely appreciated among philosophers how much set theory can be coded
even in very weak theories of arithmetic. Everyone knows that PA is capable of talking
about finite sets of numbers, but PA can also talk about lots of infinite sets, too. This is
because, even though PA cannot define truth for the whole of the language of arithmetic,
it can define truth for ever larger fragments. In particular, there is a Σn sentence
Satn,σ(x) such that IΣ1 proves the Tarski clauses for Σn formulae and therefore proves,
for each Σn formula A(x) the Sat-sentence: Satn,σ(pA(v0)q) ≡ A(val(σ, 0)). One can
therefore use Σn formulae as codes for Σn-definable sets when working in IΣ1 (Hájek
and Pudlák, 1993, §I.1(d), esp. p. 60, Remark 1.80).
58Note that this works because the model we get is, obviously, one in the natural
numbers (as IΣ1 understands them), and this is true even if T is, say, ZFC.
59The definition is on p. 85 of Hajék and Pudlák’s book, for those who would like to
explore it. Thanks to Ali Enayat for making it a little clearer to me.
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ÎΣ1
T+L +Q that we need to interpret are these two:
∀x(0 6= Sx)
Denα(p0q, 0)
The first comes from Q itself; the second, from the semantics. The point to
note is that the term ‘0’ occurs in both of these and so must be interpreted
the same way both times, or at least in ways that are compatible. The
mere fact that IΣ1 + Con(Q) both interpets Q and gives us a semantics
for the language of Q doesn’t guarantee that. For all we know so far, the
former could interpret ‘0’ as ‘S0’ while the latter told us that ‘0’ denotes
0.
This needn’t happen, however, because the two versions of the arith-
metized completeness theorem are closely related. It is really the second
that is more fundamental. The way you get an interpretation of T once
you have a model of T is the same way you can always get an interpre-
tation of T once you have a model of T : You just interpret it the way
the model tells you to interpret it. So if the model tells you that some
term t denotes u, you translate t as ‘u’. If the model tells you that some
predicate R(x, y) has as its extension the set S, then you translate R(x, y)
as meaning: <x, y> ∈ S.60 And, of course, you restrict the quantifiers to
the domain of the model. The fact that T is provably true in the model
will then imply that T ’s axioms, so translated, are provably true. Which
means that we’ve successfully interpreted T .
What this means in our case is that the interpretation and the model
do ‘fit together in the right way’. If the semantic theory says that ‘0’
denotes S0, then the interpretation of ‘0’ will be ‘S0’. Some fiddling may
be necessary here and there to get everything completely in sync, but
this is merely tedious.
So that takes care of the interpretation of T and the interpretation of
the semantics for L. What’s left is (iii), the underlying syntax, IΣ1. As
noted earlier, much of that is trivial, since we’re working in IΣ1 + Con(T )
and so have IΣ1 readily available. So if we were just trying to interpret
ÎΣ1
TL+T , we’d be done. What we’re actually trying to interpret, however,
is ÎΣ1 T
+
L + T , and so what we lack at this point—all we lack—is a
demonstration that the extended induction axioms can be proven in
IΣ1 + Con(T ), given the interpretation of T , and of the semantics for L,
that we’ve already got.
It is here, then, that we need to make use of what we know about
the complexity of the model and, in particular, of its associated notions
of denotation, satisfaction, and truth. If the formula we were using to
interpret Satα(x) were, say, Σ2, then we’d have no hope whatsoever of
60Note that this is all intensional: In the theory in which we are working, we’ll be
given the extension of R(x, y) in a certain way, that is, by means of a certain formula;
and we then use that very formula to construct the translation of R(x, y).
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proving the translations of induction axioms containing Satα(x) in IΣ1.61
But we know that Satα(x) and its friends are LL1. The induction axioms
we’re trying to prove are, therefore, of the form ∃xφ(x), where φ(x) is
built from atomic arithmetical formulae and the translations of our
atomic semantic formulae: Denα(t, x); Satα(x); T(x); and val(σ, x). Since
these are at worst LL1, the induction axioms we’re trying to prove are
Σ1(LL1). And it just so happens that IΣ1 proves induction for Σ1(LL1)
formulae (Hájek and Pudlák, 1993, p. 85, lemma 2.78). 
It’s just beautiful the way this works out: LL1 is precisely what the
model needs to be for that last step to work.
Proof of Corollary 6.14. There are various ways of proving this. One is
to note that, in IΣ2, we get a better bound on the complexity of the model:
It’s low ∆2. So then the question is whether IΣn proves induction for
Σn(∆2) formulae, when n ≥ 2. It does (Hájek and Pudlák, 1993, p. 82,
theorem 2.67). 
It’s a nice question whether this also extends to PA—that is, to the
case where PA is our theory of syntax, rather than the object-theory. We
clearly have this:
Corollary 6.16. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory in a finite lan-
guage. Then P̂A T
+
L + T is mutually locally interpretable with PA +
Con(T ).
Proof. Each finite fragment of PA + Con(T ) is contained in one of the
IΣn + Con(T ), which is interpretable in ÎΣn T+L + T and so in P̂A T+L + T .
The converse is similar. 
The reflexivity of PA entails that of PA + Con(T ),62 so P̂A T+L + T is
globally interpretable in PA+ Con(T ), by Orey’s Theorem. It is not at
all obvious, however—to me, anyway—that P̂A T
+
L + T must be reflexive.
It would be nice if it was, though, since then we could remove “locally”
from Corollary 6.16.
6.5. Peano Arithmetic Is a Special Case (II). I’ve remarked several
times now that PA is in certain respects unrepresentative. We’re now in
a position to see another way in which that is so.
Corollary 6.17. ÎΣm T
+
L + PA is interpretable in PA.
61Note, though, that it’s nonetheless clear that this is going to work at some level or
other, given that the complexity of the model is independent of T . In the situation just
mentioned, for example, we’d be perfectly fine at IΣ2.
62Mostowski shows that every extension of PA that does not expand the language is
reflexive.
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Proof. Any finite fragment of ÎΣm T
+
L + PA is contained in one of the
theories: ÎΣm T
+
L + IΣn and so by Corollary 6.14 is interpretable in
IΣm + Con(IΣn). But PA, being reflexive, contains every such theory.
So every finite fragment of ÎΣm T
+
L + PA is interpretable in PA, which
shows that ÎΣm T
+
L +PA is locally interpretable in PA. Now invoke Orey’s
Theorem. 
Corollary 6.18. P̂A T
+
L + PA is interpretable in PA.
Proof. Any finite fragment of P̂A T
+
L + PA is contained in one of the
theories: ÎΣm T
+
L +PA. So P̂A T
+
L +PA is locally interpretable in PA and
so is interpretable in PA. 
On the other hand:
Corollary 6.19. P̂A T
+
L+ plus ‘all axioms of PA are true’ proves Con(PA).
Indeed, ÎΣ1 T
+
L plus ‘all axioms of PA are true’ proves Con(PA).
Proof. From Theorem 6.10. 
It follows, obviously, that P̂A T
+
L + PA does not prove that all axioms
of PA are true. What this means is that, once we have disentangled
the syntax from the object-language, the ‘happy accident’ that permits
PAT+ to prove Con(PA) is revealed as something more like a dirty trick.
It is only because of the interaction between the extended induction
principle and the theory whose consistency we are trying to prove that
PAT+ proves Con(PA).
The combination of Corollary 6.18 and Corollary 6.19 is notable for
another reason, as well. Deflationists about truth typically hold that
the only legitimate use for the truth-predicate is as a ‘device of general-
ization’. Precisely what that is supposed to mean has never been made
terribly clear. But one thing one might have thought it meant, or at
least implied, was something like: Assuming we have the T-sentences for
some language L, then a theory consisting of the sentences in some set S
is in some natural sense equivalent to the theory containing the single
statement “All sentences in S are true”.63 Indeed, the one attempt known
to me to explain what it might mean to “use the truth-predicate as a
device of generalization” proceeds along precisely these lines (Halbach,
1999). Considered as additions to P̂A T
+
L , however, or even as additions
to ÎΣ1 T
+
L , the two theories consisting of the axioms of PA, on the one
hand, and the single statement “All axioms of PA are true”, on the other,
63It sometimes seems to be supposed that the fact that the truth-predicate is a ‘device
of generalization’ is suitably explained by the fact that the truth-predicate allows us to
form sentences like the one just mentioned, which is of course a generalization. But “All
axioms of PA contain the symbol ‘→’” is a generalization, too. Every predicate allows
us to form generalizations we could not form without it. In what sense, then, is the
truth-predicate supposed just to be a ‘device of generalization’?
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have very different logical properties: The latter is a lot stronger than
the former.
That’s not to say, of course, that there’s not some other way of ex-
plaining what it means to ‘use the truth predicate merely as a device of
generalization’. But I don’t know what that would be.
7. CONCLUDING PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
Taken together, the results proven in Section 6.4 show that, where T
is a finitely axiomatized theory in L, Û T+L + T is mutually interpretable
with U + Con(T ), for a very wide range of choices for U . This holds, in
particular, for Q, for IΣn, so long as n ≥ 1, and even for PA (though
in this last case we have only mutual local interpretability). It would
be nice to know if more cases could be added to the list. I do not know
whether Î∆0 T
+
L + T is mutually interpretable with I∆0 + Con(T ). But
even without an answer to that question, or even if the answer turns out
to be negative, the fact that these theories are mutually interpretable in
so many cases gives us reason to suppose that the connection between
truth-theories and consistency-statements we have been exploring is
robust. More precisely, what it shows is that a compositional truth-
theory amounts to a kind of abstract consistency statement: If you build
a truth-theory for L on top of an appropriate syntax S, and then hand it
a finitely axiomatized theory T in the language it concerns, it hands you
back S plus the consistency statement for T .
This is despite the fact that, as we have seen, there is another sense in
which a compositional truth-theory adds nothing at all to the underlying
syntax: ÎΣ1 T
+
L is interpretable in IΣ1, by the same argument as given
for Lemma 6.2.64 What that shows is that one needs to be very careful
about how one measures the strength of truth-theories.
This observation is relevant to another issue that comes up in the
literature on deflationism. Facts about what happens when one adds
various semantic assumptions to PA play a critical role in the discussion
of the so-called conservativeness argument, championed by Stewart
Shapiro (1998) and Jeffrey Ketland (1999). The argument emerges from
the thought that a deflationary truth-predicate, being in some sense
‘insubstantial’, ought not to allow us to prove anything we cannot prove
without it. That is: UT+ ought to be a conservative extension of U . But,
of course, PAT+ proves Con(PA) and so isn’t a conservative extension of
PA.
In his response to this argument, Hartry Field places very heavy
weight upon the fact that the non-conservativity result depends essen-
tially upon the presence of the new induction axioms and is not due
64Indeed, it would appear that, so long as T ⊇ Q, T̂ T+L is going to be interpretable in
T .
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simply to the presence of a compositional truth-theory.65 In particular, if
we add a compositional truth-theory to PA without extending induction,
then the result is a conservative extension of PA (Parsons, 1981, pp.
213–15). And so Field writes:
Since truth can be added in ways that produce a con-
servative extension. . . , there is no need to disagree with
Shapiro when he says that “conservativeness is essential
to deflationism”. . . . Shapiro’s position, however, is that a
deflationist must hold that adding ‘true’ to number the-
ory in the full-blooded way that involves [extending the
induction axioms also] produces a conservative extension.
(1999, p. 536)
Field goes on to argue that a deflationist need hold no such thing. At
most, the deflationist should hold that the principles that are “essential
to truth”—that flow from its disquotational nature—are conservative
over number theory. But, Field claims, the induction principles are not
“essential to truth” in the relevant sense: Their truth flows not from the
nature of truth, but from the nature of the natural numbers. They are
not semantical but arithmetical in character.
I more or less agree with this last point, though what Field ought to
have said is that the induction axioms are syntactic in character, not
arithmetical. What our discussion here shows, however, is that Field’s
emphasis on induction is misplaced.
In what seems to me the crucial passage, Field quotes Shapiro’s (1998,
p. 499) question: “How thin can the notion of arithmetical truth be if, by
invoking it, we can learn more about the natural numbers?” and then
replies:
. . . [T]he way in which we “learn more about the natural
numbers by invoking truth” is that in having that notion
we can rigorously formulate a more powerful arithmetical
theory than we could rigorously formulate before. There
is nothing very special about truth here: using any other
notion not expressible in the original language we can get
new instances of induction, and in many cases these lead
to nonconservative extensions. (Field, 1999, p. 536)
There are two respects in which this is at best misleading.
What does Field mean by “using [a] notion not expressible in the
original language”? The natural way to read him would be as talking
about definability, about what happens if we add a new predicate that
allows us to define a set not definable in the original language. In that
case, Field would be saying this:
65See also Halbach’s (2001b) treatment of the argument.
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TABLE 1. Some Mathematical Facts
If we add a new predicate that defines a set not definable
in the original language, we can get new instances of
induction, which may lead to new theorems in the original
language.
That is of course right. We can get new instances that may lead to new
theorems. But the case of the truth-predicate is precisely not one of those
cases. Tarski’s Theorem tells us that the set of truths of the language of
PA is not definable in the language of arithmetic. This has nothing to
do with whether we add a fully compositional truth-theory, as opposed
just to adding just the T-sentences. Either way, we will be able to define
a set we could not previously define: It will be defined by T(x). Let
me say that again. If we add a truth-predicate T(x) to the language of
PA and extend PA by adding the T-sentences, then that is enough to
guarantee that T(x) defines the set of truths of the language of PA and
so defines a set not definable in the original language. But even if we
extend induction, the result is still a conservative extension of PA. The
moral, then, is supposed to be this: The non-conservativity result is not
due just the presence of “new instances of induction” formulated using a
“notion not expressible in the original language”. The presence of a fully
compositional truth-theory is essential. Indeed, what I should like to say
is that what is most responsible for the non-conservativity result is the
compositional truth-theory, not the extension of induction.
When truth-theories are considered simply as additions to PA, it is
essentially impossible to disentangle the contributions being made by
the truth-theory, on the one hand, and the extension of induction, on the
other. The mathematical facts are summarized in table 1. So long as we
do not both add a compositional truth-theory and extend the induction
scheme, the resulting theory is conservative over PA and interpretable
in PA. How are we supposed to choose whom to blame, then? Does it
even make sense to blame one rather than the other?
We have seen, however, that PA is a special case. We have also seen
that the usual way of formalizing truth-theories can lead to peculiar
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Û TL + T
Not interpretable
Û T+L + T
Not interpretable,
and stronger still
TABLE 2. Some Other Mathematical Facts (U = IΣn, PA)
phenomena. And if we now look again, with these lessons in mind—
if we focus not on conservativity but on interpretability;66 if we make
sure the object-theory is finitely axiomatized; and if we disentangle the
syntax from the object-theory—then the facts, summarized in table 2,
look very different.67 What we see is that adding the compositional
principles results in an increase in logical strength whether or not we
extend the induction axioms.68 Extending the induction axioms, on the
other hand, results in an increase in strength only in the presence of a
fully compositional truth-theory. That suggests, to me, anyway, that it is
the compositional truth-theory that is doing the work here.
By themselves, of course, these observations do not pose a serious
problem for anyone, deflationists included. They do, however, make it
clear that, as a matter of mathematical fact, the compositional princi-
ples have substantial logical strength. That makes it worth asking how
deflationists intend to earn a right to them: The various principles com-
prising a compositional truth-theory cannot be regarded as a collection
of trivialities on the order of the T-sentences.69 But that issue, I shall
have to discuss on another occasion.70
66Do the conservativity results still hold when we consider weaker theories? Is IΣ1T
a conservative extension of IΣ1? The proof of this, in the case of PA, is far from trivial,
and I have no idea whether it works for weaker theories.
67I’m assuming here, of course, that T is not a theory whose consistency is inde-
pendently provable in IΣ1, e.g., Q: The methods used above show that ÎΣ1 T
+
L + Q is
interpretable in IΣ1, since it is interpretable in IΣ1 + Con(Q), and IΣ1 proves Con(Q).
68Since these results hold even with U = PA, we do not need to restrict the syntax
in any way to get these sorts of results. What matters is that the object-theory should
be finitely axiomatized. But that is simply because we can’t hope to prove that all the
theory’s axioms are true otherwise.
69In my view (Heck, 2004), the T-sentences themselves are not trivialities, either, but
this is a separate issue.
70Thanks to Volker Halbach and Jeff Ketland for conversations early in the history
of this paper, and to Josh Schechter for conversations later on, that helped greatly.
Comments on a draft of the paper from Cezary Cies´lin´ski and Ali Enayat did much to
improve it. A talk based upon the paper was given at a conference on philosophical logic,
organized by Delia Graff Fara and held at Princeton University in April 2009. The paper
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